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Abstract
In my thesis I explore how to best award spectrum licenses to mobile network op-
erators. During the last twenty years governments have shifted their preferred method
of awarding spectrum from comparative awards to auctions. The praised VCG mech-
anism does not apply well to auctioning spectrum and instead simultaneous multiple
round auction, clock auction, and combinatorial clock auction models are used. These
models have flaws causing bidders to lack an unambiguous dominant strategy and
practice demand reduction. Each spectrum auction is different and there exists no
one-size-fits-all solution. Thus, the auction design process carries tremendous weight
when attempting to organize a successful spectrum award.
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1 Introduction
The goal of this thesis is to explain the difficulty associated with allocating spectrum licenses
to mobile networks operators. It acts as a summary of the challenges regulators face when
designing spectrum auctions and is meant to act as guidance to policy makers in pointing
out the central issues a regulator needs to address when auctioning spectrum. I focus on
auctions since they are currently the best way for national regulators to allocate spectrum
licenses. There exist unsolved problems, such as demand reduction and lack of equilibrium,
that plague the allocation process even when using auctions. I analyze the role of spectrum
auction design, which consists of product design, mechanism choice and rule design, as pos-
sible means to overcome some of these issues.
The outline of the thesis is as follows. In the rest of introduction I explain in detail the
characteristics of spectrum as an awardable good and why the topic is relevant. In the
second section I explain governments’ objectives in spectrum awards as well as cover the
relatively short history of spectrum awards, arguments for using auctions, and the role of
the aftermarket. In the third section I introduce VCG mechanism as an efficient mech-
anism for allocating goods and explain why it is not used to auction spectrum. Fourth
section introduces popular spectrum auction models and the theory behind them. Fifth
section reviews the challenges left unaddressed by spectrum auction models while the sixth
section explores the spectrum auction design process as a possible answer to these challenges.
Throughout this thesis I will keep referring to specific spectrum auctions, their regulations1
and their results. These are listed in appendix A. I will refer to an auction by country name
and the year the auction was held in. For example, Finnish 2013 auction will refer to Finnish
800 MHz auction held in 2013. I use years to identify different auctions to avoid confusion
as some spectrum has already been auctioned twice.
1.1 Characteristics of spectrum as an awardable good
People have long joked about government making money by putting a price on the air that
its citizens breathe, but one might argue that by selling spectrum licenses, governments are
doing exactly that. There seems to be no shortage of demand for air either. The German
1Auction regulations are official texts which include information on the auction. They usually cover the
goods sold, the auction model used and the rules imposed.
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telecommunications regulator, Bundesnetzagentur, managed to raise e5.1 billion in a spec-
trum auction that concluded after three weeks of bidding on 19.7.2015. The ones buying are
mobile network operators, henceforth referred to as MNOs, who require spectrum to provide
services to consumers.
The invisible electromagnetic waves, known as electromagnetic spectrum or simply spec-
trum, are the key to transmitting data wirelessly. Every phone call we make and text
message we send on our mobile phones is possible thanks to this unique scarce good. Unlike
natural resources such as fossil fuels, the amount of spectrum available for use stays constant.
It simply exists in the atmosphere where it cannot be destroyed, nor can new spectrum be
created. Spectrum cannot be stolen, but it is possible to cause interference and diminish its
value to other users. Therefore all governments and several international organizations such
as International Telecommunications Union, which is a United Nations specialized agency
for information and communication technologies responsible for coordinating spectrum use
globally, attempt to control the use of spectrum by licensing it.
In the aforementioned German auction Bundesnetzagentur sold licenses for 270 MHz of
spectrum, but this is only a fraction of the approximately 300 GHz of spectrum currently
available for use. Most of the spectrum has been either allocated for government specific
purposes ranging from space research to maritime radios or is unprofitable to use with cur-
rent technologies. Since spectrum in government’s use is awarded through political decision
making, and not auctions, it is of no interest to us. The benefits of assigning a larger share
of spectrum licenses through market forces, and how it should be accomplished, are possible
research questions for the future. This thesis focuses solely on spectrum used by mobile
network operators to provide services such as mobile telephone calls, text messaging, and
mobile internet connections.
Despite the coordination efforts by ITU, licenses and spectrum maps, which are the result
of spectrum planning and indicate for what use the entirety of spectrum has been allocated,
differ greatly between continents and even countries. For example, in Europe the spectrum
licenses assigned to MNOs are always sold as nationwide licenses while in the U.S. and Aus-
tralia they are fragmented into state, county and city-sized licenses. This thesis focuses on
European spectrum awards2, although most of the theory and concepts covered are applica-
2The use of auctions to award spectrum licenses has mostly been pioneered by the U.S. regulator FCC.
A large part of the literature cited is written by economists and other staff who have worked with the FCC
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ble to spectrum auctions everywhere.
Most of the technicalities of spectrum will be omitted in this thesis, but there are few
key characteristics essential to the mechanism design discussed later that are worth men-
tioning. Spectrum is mapped using frequencies which range from 0 to 300 GHz, with more
interesting frequencies existing in the lower end of the range. Lower frequencies are always
more valuable than higher frequencies as signals travel farther and pierce walls better when
sent on lower frequencies (Rappaport, 1996). The distance traveled and piercing capability
approximately halve when the frequency doubles, so licenses for spectrum in 1400 MHz band
are worth approximately half as much as those for spectrum in 700 MHz band. Due to higher
frequencies being worth less in general, there are more of them available for MNOs to use.
Thus higher frequencies are often used for carrying capacity3 in densely populated areas,
while lower frequencies are used for providing coverage in rural areas.
Spectrum is divided into bands, which are divided into blocks, which are then awarded
to MNOs. Each block can be seen as a license to use spectrum on specific frequencies and
thus terms block and spectrum license will be used interchangeably in this paper. The size
of blocks can vary, but the most recent technology makes best use of 5 MHz blocks making
it the most common block size used in recent spectrum awards. Three different types of
blocks can be awarded. Most relevant bands such as the 700, 800, 900 and 1800 MHz bands
are commonly awarded as FDD4 blocks. Some bands are dedicated to TDD5 blocks, which
use a newer technology which is not yet as widely spread. Third type of blocks awarded
contain supplementary downlink frequencies (SDL for short), which only grants extra down-
link capacity. Downlink is generally regarded as more valuable than uplink since customers
tend to download significantly more than they upload. The importance has increased lately
due to rising popularity of various internet streaming services, such as YouTube, Netflix and
in the past. Such literature sometimes emphasizes issues which might be absent in Europe due to different
spectrum planning.
3Carrying capacity is the amount of data that can be transferred wirelessly. It is often more important
than coverage in densely populated areas such as cities.
4Frequency Divided Duplex, or FDD for short, technology separates uplink (traffic from mobile phone to
the base station) and downlink (traffic from base station to mobile phones) by using blocks separated by a
spectrum gap. FDD blocks always contain two blocks, one for uplink and one for downlink, making the size
of a usual FDD block 2*5 MHz
5Time Divided Duplex, or TDD, technology separates uplink and downlink traffic using different time
slots, enabling both channels to operate within the same block.
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Spotify, which are often used on mobile devices.
Figure 1: Licenses in the 700 MHz band.
Figure 1 has an example of six FDD blocks in the 700 MHz band that will be awarded in
Finland in 2016. Each block has a specific location in the band marked by exact frequencies
said block is allowed to use. As stand-alone products these six blocks are, in principle, sub-
stitutes to each other. In fact, blocks within any band are, in principle, substitutes to other
similarly sized blocks within the same band. Blocks within nearby bands, for example 700
MHz and 800 MHz bands, can also be thought of as near-perfect substitutes. However, since
higher frequencies such as 1800 MHz often serve a different purpose, these can be thought
of as complements to the blocks on using frequencies below 1000 MHz.
Unfortunately reality is more complicated than this. The current technology enables MNOs
to benefit greatly from acquiring contiguous blocks. Two contiguous block provide more
carrying capacity than two separate blocks, even if they are all situated in the same band.
Combining this with the multi-unit demand present in most spectrum awards makes blocks
such as FDD1 and FFD2 in the above picture complements, while FDD1 and FFD3-6 remain
substitutes. This poses a great challenge to policy makers, since having operators operate
with non-contiguous blocks can be seen as inefficient use of spectrum. This is one of the
essential differences between spectrum auctions and other multi-unit auctions, such as trea-
sury bond auctions, which often can assume bidders having decreasing marginal utility for
additional goods obtained.
1.2 Relevance of the topic
Historically television broadcasting has taken up a large number of spectrum bands in the
very valuable below 1 GHz area. Due to technological innovations that allow television
broadcasting to operate with less spectrum, some of the spectrum has recently been freed
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up to be repurposed for other uses. This freed spectrum, which has been dubbed the digital
dividend, has in most countries been assigned to wireless internet use and thus needs to
be awarded to MNOs who can then use it to provide the required services to consumers.
Besides the technological innovations, there is an enormous outside pressure towards govern-
ments to assign more spectrum to wireless internet use. The evolution of smartphones and
tablets, combined with the emergence of streaming services, has caused the amount of data
transferred wirelessly to skyrocket. In Finland the amount of data transferred wirelessly
has increased 1728 fold between years 2007 and 2014, from 154TB to 266107TB (FICORA,
2015). It is expected to keep rising as more and more people adopt the smartphone technol-
ogy and the quality of wireless services, most importantly video streaming, increases.
In addition to the aforementioned allocation of digital dividend, a new wave of technol-
ogy is in the making. Globally dubbed as 5G, it is said to benefit traditional spectrum users
as well as make completely new parties interested in obtaining spectrum by enabling internet
of things, which has various applications in all kinds of industries. Such applications are,
for example, self-driving cars and self-monitoring machines. The applications for machine-
to-machine technologies seem endless and only time will tell how many industries will make
use of them. Researchers claim one of the current bottlenecks related to the anticipated rev-
olution of internet of things is lack of spectrum, ensuring that we will see spectrum awards
being held in the future as well.6
The search for the best way to allocate spectrum is now at its height and will remain a
hot topic for an unforeseeable future. National regulators are on the lookout for a fast
and legally robust way to allocate spectrum efficiently. They agree almost unanimously on
auctions being the superior way to allocate spectrum, but there is no consensus on which
auction format is the best. Instead, both in academic literature and in policy articles (see for
example Klemperer (2002) and RSPG (Forthcoming 2016)), most parties are emphasizing
that every spectrum auction has to be designed from scratch for the specific market and type
of spectrum sold. Furthermore, a large number of failed spectrum auctions, latest happening
in 2015, highlights the need to further research spectrum auction design.
6These points were emphasized in Finnish 5G-seminar organized by Finnish Communications Regulatory
Authority on October 22nd 2015. Seminar presentations can be found at https://www.viestintavirasto.
fi/5gseminaari2015/index/ohjelmajaesitykset.html (Accessed on May 5th 2016).
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2 Spectrum award objectives and how to fulfill them
Objectives of spectrum awards are defined by governments and international laws and agree-
ments. Radio Spectrum Policy Group, which is appointed by European Commission and rep-
resents all European regulators, has listed the most common objectives in their forthcoming
Report on Awards (RSPG, Forthcoming 2016). The most important objectives, which have
also been emphasized by Binmore and Klemperer (2002) who advised British government,
are using and allocating spectrum efficiently and promoting competition.
Efficient use of spectrum involves technology more than economics. Technology allows spec-
trum to be used more efficiently when the user has access to two contiguous blocks as
compared to a scenario where he has two separate blocks in the same band. Efficient use
also includes the obvious case that all available spectrum should be awarded as long as there
is demand for it 7. Thankfully these objectives are unambiguous and hence often easier to
achieve than those mentioned below.
In economics efficient allocation is often assumed to refer to Pareto efficiency which can be
defined as follows (Jehle and Reny, 2006)
A feasible allocation x ∈ X is Pareto efficient if there is no other feasible allocation x′ ∈ X
such that x′i i xi, ∀i ∈ I, with at least one preference strict.
However, in mechanism design theory the term efficiency has a narrower meaning than
Pareto efficiency as it only takes into account the preferences of those N ∈ I agents par-
ticipating in the mechanism (Milgrom, 2004). This poses a problem to the policy maker,
as he would like to maximize the overall utility, taking into account also those not partici-
pating in the mechanism. Jehiel and Moldovanu (2003) note that selling licenses to a new
entrant affects the profits of incumbents negatively, but allowing an incumbent operator to
have monopoly power in a market can seriously harm the consumers. Figuring out how the
market can decide which alternative is better, and at which prices for licenses, is one of the
central questions in spectrum awards.
Promoting competition, which is the objective emphasized in literature, springs from the
willingness to maximize social surplus. It is understood as attracting new entrants and safe-
7There is an example from Romanian spectrum auction in 2013 which resulted spectrum being unawarded
due to flawed rules that resulted in bids on previous rounds ceasing to be binding in the subsequent rounds.
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guarding existing competition. The goal is often stated as to at least roughly preserve the
ratios of market shares of current MNOs while at the same time encouraging new competi-
tors to enter the market. The simplest way to attract new entrants is setting aside spectrum
for them. However, this is often not enough since an operator needs a large and diversified
basket of spectrum licenses to be fully competitive. Thus additional means, such as allowing
roaming on other operators’ networks at a regulated price, have also been applied (Binmore
and Klemperer, 2002).
While it is emphasized to focus on attracting new entrants and promoting competition, there
is actually a different trend present in the European telecommunications markets. In many
European countries the key spectrum licenses are divided between three different MNOs8.
In Europe’s largest market, Germany, a switch from four to three operators happened in
2014 and despite serious effort the country failed to attract new entrants in the spectrum
auction it held in 2015. In both France and Britain, the next two largest markets, there
are currently news about takeovers which, if approved by the regulators, will result in three
player markets. One reason for this trend could be that telecommunications markets are in
fact natural oligopolies (Valletti, 2003), a topic that in my view is worth researching further.
Whatever the case, reducing the number of participants to three has increased the difficulty,
and the importance, of spectrum auction design.
Other common, but not as vital from an award design perspective, objectives that RSPG
lists are increasing broadband penetration and enhancing coverage in rural areas. Since pro-
viding services in rural areas is often economically irrational, governments add requirements
for the blocks they sell. These can for example oblige the buyer to reach a certain milestone
in coverage and/or penetration within a given time period. Often these requirements reduce
the value of the blocks they are attached to, potentially making the block less perfect of a
substitute to other blocks on sale.
Revenue can be one of the goals for a government holding a spectrum auction, but it is
usually subjected to achieving other goals first (Klemperer, 2002). Most governments refrain
of mentioning revenue as a goal, but for example U.S. Federal Communications Commission
(henceforth FCC) mentioned lost revenue as one of the failures of awarding spectrum through
8There are also cases where operators form joint ventures before auctions. In Sweden for example, there
are four operators but only three companies have won spectrum in recent auctions.
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other means than auctions. Spectrum auction literature does not cover revenue maximizing
mechanisms and similarly these will not be covered in this thesis.
Governments are also known to value award processes that are fast, cheap, and, prefer-
ably, as transparent as possible to increase their legal robustness. One has to wonder how,
for much of the last century, the award processes were in fact the exact opposite.
2.1 Development of spectrum awards
When the use of radio spectrum was first mastered in 1897 there was an abundance of spec-
trum and the licenses were awarded, then with efficiency, by a first come, first serve basis.
In the 1920s the broadcasting industry started to be considered a unique industry requiring
regulation, which lead to governments deciding on to whom the spectrum licenses should be
awarded to. However, it was not until the 1950s when the topic of assigning the rights to
this scarce resource through the use of market forces was brought to attention first by Leo
Herzel (Herzel, 1951) and then by Ronald Coase (Coase, 1959), who argued that it would be
fairer to allocate the resource through the use of an auction instead of comparative hearings.
Still, for two decades following Coase’s article, Federal Communications Commission and
the regulators in other countries kept awarding spectrum licenses mainly through adminis-
trative processes which are also sometimes referred to as beauty contests. In 1981 the FCC
finally acknowledged the inefficiencies of assigning non-regulated spectrum licenses by beauty
contests and opted to use lotteries instead. It is somewhat a mystery to economists why even
after so long the regulator did not opt for auctions. It turned out lotteries also had several
problems, most notable one being the massive loss of revenue for the government, which was
estimated at $46 billion for the 1980s alone (McMillan, 1994). Instead of government coffers,
this potential revenue went to the large amount of opportunistic speculators attending the
lotteries. Their goal was to sell any licenses they managed to win to MNOs, making large
zero-risk profits in the process.
Three possible hypotheses have been proposed as to why auctions were not employed, with a
few exceptions, before 1990s (Hazlett, 1998)9. The first hypothesis is what Hazlett calls error
9In his article Hazlett also covers much of the history of spectrum awards in the United States. He
emphasizes how using market prices to determine the spectrum access was proposed to FCC over two dozen
times between 1927 and 1992 without much effect.
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theory, where the government and the regulator are assumed to simply have had erroneous
beliefs. Second hypothesis, the so called public trustee theory, says that letting the market
assign spectrum licenses would diminish government control over key outputs. Last hypoth-
esis, the franchise rent theory, claims that the government was eager to protect broadcasters’
rents for the return of some authority over them.
Hazlett concludes his article by noting that none of these theories are convincing, adding
that the spectrum awards before 1990s were not only an inefficient but also an illogical acci-
dent in the history. The discussed award procedures not fulfilling all of the aforementioned
objectives for spectrum awards strengthens his argument. It is also supported by the fact
that the decision to award spectrum licenses through auctions, which took place in 1993
when the U.S. Congress tasked FCC to encourage ”efficient and intensive use of electromag-
netic spectrum”, was propelled not by new economic theories, but instead by a change in the
political climate. It is also probable that evolving computational technologies, which made
arranging large scale auctions significantly easier, was one of the factors behind Congress’
decision. Following FCC’s successful spectrum auction in 1994 many European governments
adapted auctions as the primary way to award spectrum copying the best practices from the
U.S..
2.2 Arguments in favor of using auctions
The first argument usually mentioned when discussing auctions as a mean to award spec-
trum is efficiency. There exist mechanisms (e.g. VCG mechanism) which can be shown to
lead to an efficient allocation under rather general assumptions. However, allocation effi-
ciency is not the only goal that matters. Jehiel and Moldovanu (2003) list six other goals
that might, depending on the setting, encourage the use of auctions as a tool for allocating
goods. The five that are of interest to a policy maker tasked with awarding spectrum are
revenue-maximization, valuation and price discovery, transparency and fairness, speed and
low administrative costs, and promotion of competition.
The importance of revenue-maximization is arguable, as most policy makers distance them-
selves from the idea by explicitly stating that they do not wish to maximize revenue(Binmore
and Klemperer, 2002). Still, auctions ending at low prices can cause criticism towards the
regulator. When a second price auction is used and the winning bidder bids several times
more than the highest losing bidder, as was the case in New Zealand’s spectrum auction
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in 1990 (McMillan, 1994), the regulator can get a fair share of unpleasant inquiries on the
subject. Of course, had the regulator not published the final prices there might not have
been such a large public backlash.
The fact that governments consistently opt to use reserve prices in spectrum auctions10
indicates that there might be at least some sort of a revenue related goal, although there are
other benefits to reserve prices which will be discussed in section 4.4.2. While not the trend,
some regulators (e.g. Swiss regulator) have explicitly stated that they expect to obtain a
”reasonable return” for selling their scarce public resources. I will assume that, while not
the top priority, spectrum auction designers also want to receive a certain amount of revenue
from the auction.
It is impossible for the policy maker to know the exact value for the spectrum licenses
he is awarding and thus he cannot engage in first degree price discrimination requiring each
operator to pay their full valuation (assuming policy maker would be interested in maxi-
mizing revenue). Additionally, the value cannot be determined when awarding the licenses
through negotiations as operators have clear incentives to understate their value when ne-
gotiating with the policy maker. Hence we need a mechanism like auctions to incentivize
the buyers to tell their willingness to pay to the policy maker, who would like to know the
real values regardless of revenue related goals as such knowledge allows him to allocate the
goods efficiently.
Dynamic auctions can also benefit the bidders by enabling price discovery. Cramton (2013)
writes that while bidders do a lot of analysis on the expected values of spectrum licenses
there is still much uncertainty regarding said values. He uses the European 3G auctions11 as
an example where the bidding was based more on the situation in the stock market (which
was affected by IT bubble at the time) than the actual value of licenses. This example prob-
ably says more about the difficulties operators have predicting the values of licenses than the
actual benefits of price discovery, as the 3G licenses were generally sold in dynamic auctions
which enabled price discovery, yet the prices paid by operators were way above the realized
10There has not been a spectrum auction in Europe during the last 5 years which didn’t employ reserve
prices. Curiously, France put the reserve price (416 000 000e) for its 700 MHz licenses higher than the final
prices (166 000 000e) were in German auction just half a year earlier.
113G auctions were held to allocate the then newly available spectrum in 900 MHz and 1800 MHz bands.
They were held in Europe in the late 90s and early 00s.
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values of the licenses won. However, in a case where only one operator (as opposed to the
whole industry like in the early 2000s) has heavily overvalued the licenses price discovery
could be seen as having beneficial effects for said operator.
Comparative awards are often cumbersome for the policy maker and feel unfair for the
losing participants as it is rarely clear as to why exactly they lost. They also tend to lead
to costly litigation processes that could drag on for years (Kwerel and Felker, 1985). Hence
one of the most widely accepted benefits of using auctions for awarding spectrum is their
transparency and fairness. In auctions, the rules are set in advance and are the same for
every participant. Thus when a participant is left without a license it is considerably harder
to sue the policy maker for an unfair result. Kwerel and Felker also mention that it took
both comparative awards (mostly due to litigation) and lotteries (due to a massive amount
of participants) over a year on average to award spectrum licenses. Auctions generally take
much less time even when accounting for the time it takes the policy maker to prepare the
auction. A faster award process is generally also cheaper, further encouraging the use of
auctions.
Promoting competition is by definition one of the central tasks for regulators and hence
a good argument for using auctions. Optimally the regulator would want to ensure (i) com-
petition during the market entry process, which in this case would be the spectrum award,
and (ii) sufficient competition in the consumer market after the spectrum has been awarded.
Comparative awards tend to favor well established companies12 and make it more difficult
for new companies to enter the market. As such they generally do not fulfill the first goal.
Auctions on the other hand can fulfill both these goals. While achieving the first goal is fairly
obvious, the second one requires the regulator to impose additional rules. Without them the
incumbents could for example engage in predatory bidding to deter entry. There have been
several policy instruments used by FCC to ensure sufficient competition in consumer market
(Cramton et al., 2011) but only two, set-asides and spectrum caps, have been popular in
Europe.
When set-asides are used, some spectrum is made available only to certain operators, usu-
ally new entrants. Set-asides are probably the easiest way to increase the competition in the
12These companies are often domestic making it especially difficult for international companies to en-
ter the market. Whenever spectrum is awarded through comparative awards governments might act in a
protectionist manner.
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consumer market as they guarantee at least some spectrum blocks for newcomers no matter
how much the incumbents are willing to pay. Set-asides have the downside of decreasing
competition in the auction and might cause an inefficient allocation where a less efficient
operator is awarded spectrum simply because he is a newcomer. Set-asides are less common
of the two instruments, but they have nevertheless been used successfully for example in
United Kingdom’s 3G auction in 2000, where part of the success can probably be attributed
to there being many potential entrants competing for the set-aside license. In most 3G auc-
tions obtaining a single license could allow a company to become a successful mobile network
operator. However, this is no longer the case in auctions involving several bands of spectrum
where using set-asides is much more complicated as the policy maker would have to estimate
the exact portfolio of spectrum licenses a newcomer requires in order to successfully facilitate
his entry to the market.
The more popular option (in fact so popular that it is used in almost every European spec-
trum auction, regardless of other instruments applied) is to impose a spectrum cap, which
limits the amount of spectrum a single operator can win in an auction. Spectrum caps are
usually imposed as a MHz based limit on the amount of spectrum an operator can win in an
auction or own in certain bands13. The latter also takes into account the possible ownership
of spectrum licenses awarded before the auction and thus inflicts a more significant restric-
tion on incumbent operators. Spectrum caps foster competition in the consumer market
while still enabling reasonable competition in the auction itself. They also enable the actual
allocation to be determined within the auction while set-asides usually offer a predetermined
block to the entrant. Hence a spectrum cap is usually the more appealing option.
2.3 The role of the aftermarket: does the award procedure mat-
ter?
People criticizing auctions have claimed that the award procedure does not matter and that
lotteries are fine as long as resale of licenses is allowed. These critics usually cite Coase the-
orem to strengthen their argument. Coase never properly defined this theorem in his article
The Problem of the Social Cost (Coase, 1960), but it is commonly understood as follows
(Posner, 1993):
13For example, a popular spectrum cap limits the amount of MHz of spectrum an operator can own below
1 GHz. The operator is then free to choose, subject to for example a 60 MHz cap, whether he wants to buy
licenses in the 700 MHz, 800 MHz or 900 MHz bands.
15
‘If transaction costs are zero, the initial assignment of a property right – for example, whether
to the polluter or to the victim of pollution – will not affect the efficiency with which resources
are allocated.’
According to the theorem, regardless of how the spectrum licenses are allocated initially,
as long as there are clearly defined property rights, the agents will ensure the licenses end
up in an efficient allocation by trading in the aftermarket. The reason for this is that as long
as there is inefficiency, agents will have an incentive to sell, buy, and swap. While trading
can improve inefficiency, the critics forget several weaknesses of the Coase theorem.
To start with, the assumption that transaction costs are zero is far from realistic. If nothing
else, it costs the agents time and manpower to come to an agreement. Furthermore, Mil-
grom (2004) lists other assumptions of the Coase theorem that may fail in the aftermarket
trading, such as agents’ values reflecting social values, agents having unlimited budgets, and
licenses not having externalities. Milgrom further argues that to counter the critics’ argu-
ments one only needs to apply two well-known propositions. First, one can show that there
exists no mechanism that will reliably fix the inefficient allocation. To see this one can use
Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem (Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983) to show that inefficien-
cies are inevitable in bargaining if the initial allocation is inefficient and the participants
have private information. Second, one can show that there exist auction mechanisms which,
under certain assumptions, result in an efficient allocation for any number of licenses.
This by no means indicates that the aftermarket is useless. In such a fast evolving in-
dustry the value licenses have to different companies can change rapidly. Since licenses are
usually awarded for more than a decade at a time, allowing resale can help correct some
inefficiencies. While spectrum licenses being traded is still a rather rare event in Europe,
a very recent example is available. In 2015, British telecommunications regulator Ofcom
approved a large trade of 40 MHz worth of licenses in the 1500 MHz band (Ofcom, 2015).
Two operators, Vodafone and Hutchison, bought the spectrum licenses from Qualcomm,
an equipment manufacturer, after new technologies enabled profitable applications of said
spectrum..
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3 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
While this paper focuses on modern spectrum auction models and their shortcomings, it is
necessary to be familiar with Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism14 since it is a cornerstone
for the more applied models used in spectrum auctions. It is built around the key article by
William Vickrey (1961) and has been later reinforced by Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973). I
focus on its virtues by showing proofs that, under general assumptions, VCG mechanism can
be used to efficiently allocate multiple goods to multiple bidders. Although quite different
from the models used in recent European spectrum auctions, VCG mechanism essentially
aims at the same objective: to maximize the social surplus. The reasons why VCG mecha-
nism is not used in practice will be covered at the end of this section.
I now introduce the mechanism formally and show that it expands well into a multi-unit
case such as an auction for spectrum licenses. My notation is as follows. We are in an
environment with N agents, mobile network operators, with private types θi ∈ Θi, i ∈ N ,
indicating their values for the spectrum licenses sold. The private types assumption means
that the type of agent i does not depend on types of other agents. Formally we can write
that for all i ∈ {1, ..., N}
vi(x, θi, θ−i) = vi(x, θi, θ′−i) for each θ−i, θ
′
−i ∈ Θ−i.
I assume all agents know their own type. There is a set of possible decisions by the principal
(assumed to be the policy maker) X where individual decisions x also include the cases where
multiple licenses are sold to multiple buyers. I denote the vector of goods (e.g. spectrum
licenses) on offer as x¯. Then vi(xi, θ) can be understood as bidder i’s value for any non-
negative vector of goods xi. For now, all licenses are assumed to be homogeneous and the
bidders are assumed to have monotonically non-increasing marginal values for the licenses.
I assume the simple case where the good sold has no value to the principal whose value
is denoted v0 = 0, and where transfers are only made between the principal and the agents,
meaning t0 =
∑
i ti. The first is a realistic assumption in a spectrum auction setting as spec-
trum has essentially no value to the government but has a lot of value to the MNOs, who
14Mechanisms exist in games where one player, usually called principal and which can be thought of as the
auctioneer in the context of this paper, conditions his behavior on information sent to him by other players.
A mechanism dictates how said information affects the outcome of the game. Hence mechanism design is
often used to affect the way players behave in the game.
17
make transfers only to the government. Lastly, I assume that agents i ∈ N have quasi-linear
utilities. Hence we can write
ui((x, t), θ) = vi(x, θ)− ti.
In the VCG mechanism each bidder i ∈ N reports his value vˆi(xi, θi) to the principal who
then computes a value maximizing allocation according to the following allocation rule:
x? ∈ arg max
x∈X
N∑
i=1
vˆi(xi, θi)
subject to
N∑
i=1
xi ≤ x¯
In VCG mechanisms transfers paid by agent i are not affected by his actions. This removes
the incentive to report non-truthfully. Vickrey auction belongs to the group of pivot mech-
anisms where agent i is pivotal if x∗(X,N, θi) 6= x∗(X,N−i, θ−i), i.e. if his participation
changes the outcome allocation. In pivot mechanisms the transfers made by agent i are
determined as follows
ti = τi −
N∑
j 6=i
vˆj(x
?
j , θj)
where
τi = max
x∈X
N∑
j 6=i
vˆj(xj, θj)
subject to
N∑
j 6=i
xj ≤ x¯
In spectrum auctions this means that if a bidder wins two licenses, he pays the opportunity
cost of winning those two blocks; namely the sum of the two highest rejected bids. This
payment is also equal to his marginal contribution to social surplus.
In addition to agent’s payments only depending on the actions of other agents, pivot mecha-
nism is characterized by only the pivotal participants making or receiving non-zero transfers,
which in our context means that all the operators who do not receive spectrum licenses are
not pivotal and thus make no payments. In reality agents have to pay a registration fee
which is meant to keep out the non-serious bidders. The fee however is constant and thus
does not affect the behavior in the mechanism itself. Instead, it is a sunk cost and affects
the participants decision to enter the auction in the first place. There is a chance that his
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payoffs will be negative, violating the individual rationality constraint15. This usually affects
only non-serious bidders as spectrum cap usually guarantees the incumbents at least some
spectrum, and thus positive utility. The registration fees tend to also be quite small, having
little to no effect on operator’s decisions.
The beauty of VCG mechanism is that being truthful is always optimal and, addition-
ally, being truthful is a dominant strategy. A dominant strategy is always a best response
regardless of strategies played by other agents j 6= i, j ∈ N and there is no other strategy
that has the same property. The next two theorems and proofs largely follow theorems 1
and 2 presented in Ausubel and Milgrom (2006).
Theorem 1. Truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for each bidder i ∈ N in a VCG
mechanism and when all bidders bid truthfully the outcome is efficient in a sense that it
maximizes total value.
Proof. Start by fixing the bids vˆj(xj) for all other bidders j 6= i. Next suppose that i bids
truthfully vi(xi) and this bid results in an allocation x
? and transfers t?. If i instead bids
non-truthfully v˜i(xi) this results in allocation x˜ and transfers t˜. i’s payoff from reporting
v˜i(xi) is then
vi(x˜)− t˜i = vi(x˜) +
N∑
j 6=i
vˆj(x˜j)− τi
≤ max{vi(xi) +
N∑
j 6=i
vˆj(xj)} − τi
= vi(x
?
i ) +
N∑
j 6=i
vˆj(x
?
j)− τi
= vi(x
?
i )− t?i
It can easily be seen that truthful reporting is always optimal. To see that it is a dominant
strategy, it is enough to assume that all reports are potentially pivotal (Milgrom, 2004).
This means that for all j ∈ N and θj, θ˜j ∈ Θj, where θ˜j is j’s false report, there exists a
θ−j ∈ Θ−j such that
N∑
i=1
vˆi(x˜(X,N, θ˜j, θ−j), θ) <
N∑
i=1
vˆi(x
∗(X,N, θi), θ).
15Individual rationality constraint (sometimes also called the participation constraint) states that an agent
entering an auction has to except being better off entering than staying out.
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Then all reports have a positive probability of being pivotal and when false reports are they
lead to a worse payoff than a true report and are thus dominated by truthful reporting.
Furthermore, by construction, VCG mechanism leads to an efficient outcome since the auc-
tioneer is choosing allocation that maximized total value.
In the assumed case where agents have independent private values, meaning that agents
i’s value does not depend on θ−i, where principal’s value for the good is zero, and where all
transfers go to the principal, it follows that
x∗(θ) ∈ arg max
x
∑
i
vi(x, θ) = arg max
x
∑
i
vi(x, θi)
meaning that the efficient outcome is also Pareto efficient.
If we impose an additional assumption, we can use Holmstro¨m’s Theorem (Holmstro¨m,
1979)16 to show that VCG mechanism is actually a unique direct incentive-compatible mecha-
nism that has dominant strategies, always leads to an efficient outcome, and has zero transfers
made by losing bidders. The assumption we need is that the set of possible value functions
V is smoothly path connected meaning that for any two value functions v(x, 0) and v(x, 1)
there exists a path {v(x, θ)|θ ∈ [0, 1]} between them.
Theorem 2. Supposing value functions V are smoothly path connected and contain the zero
function, then VCG mechanism is a unique direct revelation mechanism for which truthful
reporting is a dominant strategy, the outcomes are always efficient, and there are no transfers
made by losing participants.
Proof. I prove this by showing that there can be no other mechanism with same properties
and a different transfer rule. First fix the values for all bidders but i and consider any
mechanism satisfying the assumptions. In case i reports a zero function his payoff is zero as
he is not being allocated anything. I denote the total value maximizing allocation when i
reports vi(x) by x
∗(θ) defined as above. Then Vi(θ) is i’s payoff in the VCG mechanism and
it can be denoted as
Vi(θ) = v(x
∗
i (θ), θ)− ti(θ).
Using the envelope theorem in integral form we can write (Milgrom and Segal, 2002)
Vi(θ) = Vi(0) +
∫ θ
0
v′′i (x
∗(s), s)ds.
16One can also use theorem by Green and Laffont (1979) for this proof.
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Now assume a different transfer rule tˆ(θ) in another direct revelation mechanism with truth-
ful reporting being a dominant strategy, with always efficient outcomes, and where losing
participants make no transfers. Denote the payoffs in this other mechanism as Vˆi(θ). Then
using envelope theorem as above we can write
Vˆi(θ)− Vˆi(0) =
∫ θ
0
v′′i (x
∗(s), s)ds = Vi(θ)− Vi(0).
We can write Vˆi(0) = Vi(0) = 0 as there are no transfers by losing participants, then
vi((x
∗(θ), θ)− tˆi(θ) = Vˆi(θ) = Vi(θ) = vi((x∗(θ), θ)− ti(θ)
which shows that the transfer rule has to be the same as in VCG mechanism, making
VCG mechanism the unique direct revelation mechanism for which truthful reporting is a
dominant strategy, the outcomes are always efficient, and there are no transfers made by
losing participants.
VCG mechanism is the optimal mechanism to allocate goods in a setting where the auc-
tioneer cares only about surplus maximization and not about his own revenues. Another
virtue of the VCG mechanism Ausubel and Milgrom (2006) point out is that the assump-
tions made are extremely general. For example the constraint x¯ can be replaced with any
constraint xˆ ∈ X which proves to be useful in accomplishing certain objectives set by the
policy maker, such as ensuring competition in the consumer market by setting spectrum
caps in the auction.
3.1 Issues with VCG mechanism when auctioning spectrum
Why then, as Ausubel and Milgrom put it, is VCG mechanism so lovely but lonely, never
used to auction spectrum? The main reason VCG mechanism has not seen any significant
use in practice is the vastly complicated nature of spectrum auctions which results both from
the characteristics of spectrum as well as government’s objectives for the award.
VCG mechanism’s allegedly general assumptions still assume, for example, participants hav-
ing independent private values that are known to them and bidders not having budget
constraints. The assumption that the auctioneer is only maximizing total surplus is also
questionable. Unless all goods auctioned are substitutes, the revenue can be very low or
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even zero. Ausubel and Milgrom (2002) shows that most of these assumptions are violated
when auctioning spectrum.
Mobile network operators are generally very similar firms offering an almost identical product
to consumers, who are often free to switch between service providers with minimal inconve-
nience17. Hence it is probable that their values for a set of homogeneous goods are in some
part correlated forcing us to work with interdependent values. Furthermore, MNOs tend to
have imperfect information since the values of licenses are generally not known to operators
as it is difficult to predict how the technology will evolve in 20 years. Value estimation is
further complicated by the indistinct and slow diplomatic process through which the spec-
trum bands are allocated to their respective uses.
Ausubel (1999) discusses VCG mechanism in a setting where bidders have interdependent
values. He shows that when assuming single-dimensional signals there exists a generalized
Vickrey auction which yields efficiency even when bidders have interdependent values. In a
generalized Vickrey auction the seller allocates goods according to an efficient assignment
rule which maximizes total surplus similar to the standard Vickrey auction. The payment
rule calculates bidder payments using the minimum bid a bidder could have reported to still
win the object(s) instead of actual bids. While generalized Vickrey auction is theoretically
plausible, Ausubel notes that it is inferior to efficient ascending-bid auction which assumes
less information available to the auctioneer. Furthermore, while accounting for interdepen-
dent values generalized Vickrey auction still suffers from the same issues as the standard
Vickrey auction.
Spectrum auctions usually involve complementary goods as both contiguous licenses and
licenses across to distant bands are complements. Hence allowing package bidding is often
favored by auctioneers. However, this can make the VCG mechanism lead to low or zero
revenue for the auctioneer. If two bidders bid a on one of two licenses respectively and a
third bidder bids b ≤ a on a package of two licenses the VCG payment rule results in zero
payments. While this is a very special example, it can be shown that there are more fun-
damental issues where payoff outcome is not in the core. This will be discussed along the
combinatorial clock auction model in the next section.
17The inconvenience can vary between countries. Tie-in sales, which often bind the consumer to a service
provider for a lengthy one of two year period, are nowadays quite rare in Finland.
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Ausubel and Milgrom (2002) further note how VCG mechanism is susceptible to shill bidding
and collusion even by the losing bidders when the goods sold have synergies. While shill
bidding is practically impossible in present day spectrum auctions, tacit collusion can not
be ruled out. Another drawback of a VCG mechanism, especially when applied in public
auctions, is the mechanism’s use of explicit price discrimination. Two bidders might end up
paying different prices for identical allocations. This can be illustrated with an example us-
ing two bidders and two goods. Each bidder bids a for the first item and b and c respectively
for a second item. The second bidder has larger marginal value for an additional license and
hence c > b. Assuming a > c, both bidders get one good, but bidder one pays c while bidder
two pays strictly less: b < c.
Lastly, assuming that bidders are not budget constrained might not hold in large spectrum
auctions where licenses worth several billions are auctioned simultaneously. Thus, while the
VCG mechanism is undeniably great in theory, it is almost never being used in practice.
Instead, models purposefully built for auctioning spectrum, which are more or less based on
the theory presented here, have been used.
4 Spectrum auction models
Models used in European spectrum awards are Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction (SMRA),
Clock Auction (CA), and Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) RSPG (Forthcoming 2016).
I start by introducing these models one by one, focusing on their unique features and their
general outlook. Since the models are essentially based on the same theory, I cover most of
the theory simultaneously by focusing on common characteristics between models and how
the models differ from VCG mechanism. I finish the section by comparing the models and
analyzing their key differences.
4.1 Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction
Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction (henceforth SMRA) was introduced by Federal Com-
munications Commission (McMillan, 1994) in 1994 for the specific purpose of auctioning
spectrum licenses. It is essentially a multi-unit generalization of the classic English auction.
SMRA can last for several rounds and each round bidders bid on their desired blocks. As
long as there has been a new bid on any block during a given round, a new round will
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commence, meaning that the auction only ends after no new bids whatsoever have been
announced (hence the term simultaneous auction). If the blocks are homogeneous and the
minimum increments by which the bids can be increased are sufficiently small, then SMRA
resembles a uniform price auction.
In a uniform price auction each of the k winning bidders pay the highest losing bid, the
k + 1th bid. It is clear that in uniform price auctions the transfers made by the winning
bidders are not affected by their own bids, and that losing bidders make no transfers. Hence
a uniform price auction is strategically equivalent to a VCG mechanism the same way En-
glish auction is strategically equivalent to a second price sealed-bid auction as the bidders’
optimal strategy is to keep bidding until the price equals their valuation.18
SMRA format was by no means perfect when first introduced and it has received several
modifications at the hands of national regulators and economists as they have attempted to
tailor the model to better suit their needs, and to overcome its obvious faults. Modifying
is especially common when the blocks sold are not homogeneous and/or blocks are comple-
ments, as then the auction ceases to be equivalent to a uniform price auction. A case of
heterogeneous blocks often occurs in countries which lie on the border of a unified spectrum
policy zone. European spectrum map differs from the Russian one, causing disruptions on
some frequencies (effectively making licenses for these frequencies less valuable) in countries
bordering Russia.
Blocks sold are complements in practically every auction involving multi-unit demand, forc-
ing auctioneers to augment the original model to avoid fragmentation risk19. In both Finnish
(2013) and Swedish (2010) spectrum auctions this was tackled with augmented switching
rule which allowed the standing high bidder to switch his bid to another block. Some other
countries have attempted to achieve the same goal by allowing combinatorial bidding. When
we can assume homogeneous blocks a much simpler solution involving the use of abstract
blocks can be used. I will further discuss the effect of complementarity on auction models
in 5.2. More thorough theoretical review of SMRA can be found in Milgrom (2000).
18This holds assuming bidders have single unit demands. When multi-unit demands are present, the
strategic equivalence between uniform price auction and a VCG mechanism longer holds.
19Fragmentation risk realizes when a bidder is not awarded contiguous blocks of spectrum.
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4.2 Clock Auction
Clock auction is essentially a variation of SMRA introduced for spectrum selling purposes
by Ausubel (2004) where the auctioneer sets a price for each product and all participants
inform the auctioneer whether they want to buy the product(s) at the listed price or not. If
there is excess demand on any product, the auctioneer increases the price on products with
excess demand and a new round begins. The bidding ceases simultaneously on all blocks
after there is no excess demand on any block. Winning bidders pay the final price while
losing bidders make no transfers. This format works especially well in a setting where there
is continuous bidding and no market power where it has been shown to lead to an efficient
outcome (Ausubel and Cramton, 2004).
When auctioning spectrum the above assumptions made by Ausubel and Cramton obvi-
ously do not hold, but clock auction format has other virtues as it is both strategically and
mechanically extremely simple when the auctioneer is selling only homogeneous goods. Such
was the case in the 2015 French spectrum auction where six blocks of spectrum in the 700
MHz band were auctioned. All a bidder had to do was to express his demand (in blocks)
each round and the auction ended when aggregate demand was equal to six blocks. After the
main auction an assignment phase is held where the, until now abstract, spectrum blocks are
assigned exact frequencies. This can be done by arranging a single round sealed bid auction
where bidders pay for the right to choose first or allowing the operators to come up with an
allocation themselves.
A problem might arise when two or more bidders reduce their demand simultaneously20.
This can lead to aggregate demand falling below aggregate supply and the auction ending
with one or more unsold blocks. This happens because bids on each round are separate,
meaning that the bids are not binding. While this helps to mitigate issues like exposure
problem, it is an issue regulators need to address if they want to use clock auction.
A large chunk of clock auction’s charm is lost when the policy maker is simultaneously
auctioning blocks across multiple bands. A bidder might value combinations (one 700 MHz
block, three 1500 MHz blocks) and (two 700 MHz blocks, one 1500 MHz block) equally, but
clock auction format does not allow him to express both these demands simultaneously. If
the two bands were auctioned one after another in sequential clock auctions the bidders could
20This happened in Romanian spectrum auction in 2013.
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compensate the lack of blocks won from the first auction in the second one. However, policy
makers should always attempt to sell all the blocks simultaneously as will be explained in
section 4.4.1. Therefore the use of combinatorial clock auction presented below should be
considered.
4.3 Combinatorial Clock Auction
Combinatorial Clock Auction21 (henceforth CCA) is a three phase auction model where the
first phase is essentially a clock auction, the second phase consists of a supplementary bidding
round, and the last phase is an assignment phase like the one described above. CCA is the
newest and most complicated of the three models introduced here. It has also lately become
the most popular model used in European spectrum auctions. Hence it will be analyzed in
considerably more detail than the previous two models.
Besides clock auction, CCA is the only package auction model used in recent spectrum
auctions. CCA differs from clock auction by introducing an additional phase which is a
single round sealed bid auction where bidders are allowed to submit bids at the prices of
their choosing (subject to certain a priori known limitations, such as the activity rule22 and a
spectrum cap) for all possible combinations of licenses the bidder is interested in. This phase
takes places between the clock auction phase and the assignment phase. During this second
phase the bidder is revealing his whole demand curve to the auctioneer. The auctioneer
then proceeds to find the revenue maximizing combination with the help of combinatorial
optimization.
CCA format is currently the most popular auction format used in European multi-band
auctions(RSPG, Forthcoming 2016). It has been developed over the course of several re-
search articles (See for example Ausubel et al. (2006), Day and Milgrom (2008), and Erdil
and Klemperer (2010)) and one of the key issues during its development was coming up
with an efficient payment rule. Due to bidders being allowed to bid for packages, a simple
21The auction has also been referred to by other names, especially in academic texts. A common name
for early versions of this auction was Clock Proxy Auction, but the regulators and more recent researchers
refer to it by the name used in this paper.
22CCA has an activity rule different from SMRA and clock auction as bidders have to maximize the
value they are allowed to bid for in the supplementary round already in the clock rounds. Hence instead
of bidding straightforwardly they need to bid on the largest package that is still profitable on each round.
More thorough discussion on activity rule in CCA can be found in Ausubel et al. (2011).
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second-price payment rule wouldn’t work as the prices would not necessarily be in the core,
which means that the allocation could be improved.
It is easy to show23 that a traditional second-price payment rule does not necessarily re-
sult in a core outcome when products are complements24 and package bids are allowed.
Imagine a sealed-bid auction with three bidders, two indivisible products A and B for sale,
and an allowance to make bids on both products A and B as well as the package AB. Goods
A and B are complements, but the strength of the complementary effect depends on the
bidder. Each bidder is allowed to make separate bids for each product individually as well as
a package bid for both products. Now imagine the bidders having the following bid portfolios
{A,B,AB}. Bidder one bids {20, 8, 30}, bidder two bids {6, 22, 30}, and bidder three, who
assumes strongest complementarity between the goods, bids {8, 10, 34}. The auctioneer then
searches for the combination of bids that has the highest value. This combination consists
of bidder one’s bid for product A, which was 20, and bidder two’s bid for product B, which
was 22. The combined value is 42, which is more than the package bid by bidder three.
Following the familiar second-price payment rule, each bidders pays the opportunity cost he
has inflicted on the highest losing bid. Hence bidder one pays 8 (three’s bid on product A),
and bidder two pays 10 (three’s bid on product B). The total payment is then 18, but bidder
three was actually willing to pay 34 for the package AB meaning that the outcome is not
in the core. The main problem is that the second-price payment rule says nothing about
package bids, forcing researchers to come up with a new payment rule for the model to work.
A proposed solution to this problem is using a core-selecting auction. A version of such
auction was first proposed by Day and Raghavan (2007) who acknowledged the problem
described above and proposed using constraint generation to determine the core payments.
However, unless the point consisting of Vickrey prices is in the core, this method does
not usually determine the optimal payment point but instead a group of points, referred
to as Minimum Revenue Core (MRC), that are all bidder-optimal25 core prices. Day and
Milgrom (2008) refined this solution by proposing that the optimal payment point be de-
23Cramton (2013) first used a similar example to demonstrate Vickrey-nearest-core pricing rule. However,
he used five bidders in his example.
24This problem does not arise when goods are substitutes.
25Bidder-optimality refers to all participating bidders being satisfied with the result. This essentially
follows from no bidder being willing to pay any more than the clearing prices to obtain the goods auctioned.
In other words, bidder optimal price point is in the core.
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termined by choosing the point in the core that minimizes the Euclidean distance between
it and the Vickrey payment point. This is referred to as Vickrey-nearest-core, or sometimes
closest-to-Vickrey core, pricing. Since the core is convex and the Vickrey prices are unique,
Vickrey-nearest-core rule results in a unique point that maximizes incentive to bid truthfully
(Cramton, 2013).
To illustrate this pricing rule with a figure I will return to the above example with two
products and three bidders. The Vickrey payment point was determined to be {8, 10} and
not in the core.
Figure 2: Illustration of Vickrey-nearest-core payment rule.
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We can see how in this example core is determined by the winning bids and a package
bid. Without the package bid, or if the package bid was small enough, the core would be
the same as in a standard Vickrey auction and the Vickrey payment would be the optimal
one. In our example the package bid affects the core, hence we need Vickrey-nearest-core
payment rule to determine a bidder-optimal unique price point (16, 18).
However, when a mechanism is altered by changing the payment rule, then so are inevitably
also the characteristics of said mechanism, and hence the ways bidders behave. In section 3
I discussed VCG mechanism and how truthful bidding is a dominant strategy. Furthermore,
when goods are substitutes VCG mechanism produces a unique outcome that is always in
the core. A sealed-bid auction employing a Vickrey-nearest-core payment rule (henceforth
referred to as VNC auction), which the last phase of a CCA auction represents, is not equiv-
alent to a VCG mechanism. Goeree and Lien (2016) point out that the Vickrey-nearest-core
payment rule results in a unique price point which is in the core, but only with respect to
bidder’s reported values instead of bidder’s true values. If the reports are not truthful, the
outcome is no longer necessarily in the core with respect to bidders true values. Using a
VNC auction in the case where auctioneer is selling complementary goods can be seen as a
trade-off between stability and fairness in a VNC auction and strict incentive constraints in
a VCG mechanism. Furthermore, they prove that whenever an auction is core-selecting it is
necessarily identical to the VCG mechanism. If VCG mechanism does not result in a core
outcome, no mechanism will.
Goeree and Lien prove their result by first defining VNC auction, VCG mechanism and
the cores for both of them separately, and then by showing how any core-selecting auction
is ex post payoff equivalent to a VCG mechanism. They use a relaxed version of the VCG
mechanism, as instead of dominant-strategy equilibrium Goeree and Lien’s model assumes
Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and instead of losing bidders making no payments the model
assumes that outcome is in the core. Especially this second relaxation’s would be trouble-
some for spectrum auctions, but Proposition 1 in Goeree and Lien’s paper states that all
core-selection auctions are ex-post payoff equivalent to the VCG mechanism. A corollary
is then that if VCG mechanism is not core-selecting, no other core-selecting auction exists.
Another corollary of the above result is that any auction resulting in a competitive equilib-
rium is ex-post payoff equivalent to a VCG mechanism.
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The outcome of a VCG mechanism was in the core when goods are substitutes (Ausubel
and Milgrom, 2002). In such a case the outcome of the combinatorial clock auction would
also be in the core with respect to bidders true values. When goods are not substitutes the
auctioneer has to be aware of the trade-off between a core-selecting VNC auction and a VCG
mechanism. I look into this and other issues the spectrum auctions models face in section 5.
4.4 Common characteristics
Ever since FCC introduced SMRA as the first auction model specifically tailored for auction-
ing spectrum, all subsequent variations and new models have shared certain characteristics
that are widely accepted by both the academia and the national regulators as being essential
in spectrum auctions. Hence the models discussed resemble each other in ways presented
below.
4.4.1 Simultaneous ascending design
All of the models are either ascending-bid auctions or, in the case of CCA, have an ascending-
bid phase. McMillan (1994) states the reasons behind FCC favoring an ascending auction
over the other alternative, a sealed-bid auction. The first reason is simplicity. Nalebuff and
Bulow (1993) pointed out that understanding the pricing rule can prove complex to some
bidders who are not familiar with economic theories. Kagel et al. (1987) showed in their
study that bidders indeed acted in a more optimal way in an English auction as compared
to a sealed-bid auction. In this study bidders had affiliated private values, an assumption
which could very well hold in a spectrum auction setting. They reached a similar conclusion
of sealed-bid auction leading to sub-optimal behavior in their newer experiment involving
auctions with synergies and multi-unit demands (Kagel and Levin, 2005).
The second argument in favor of using ascending-bid auction format also involves affili-
ated values and winner’s curse26. Milgrom and Weber (1982) showed that open auction is
better at reducing the force of winner’s curse by arguing that rational bidders anticipate
the winner’s curse and bid too low, and that providing more information makes bidders less
cautious resulting in higher average bids.
26Winner’s curse is a phenomenon where the winner of the auction is the bidder that has most overvalued
the object on sale. Its discovery is attributed to Wilson (1969).
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Ascending auction format has received further praise for enabling price discovery, the im-
portance of which I already pointed out in section 2.2. Auction theory usually assumes that
bidders have full knowledge of their own type and are only uncertain about the types of
other bidders. In practice, however, this usually does not hold as figuring out ones own
values can be rather difficult (Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2003). Cramton (2013) writes that
economists generally tend to ignore this issue and thus end up favoring sealed-bid auctions.
Price discovery can be seen as especially beneficial when auctioning licenses for multiple
bands simultaneously, as it helps to determine the relative values between bands. For the
same reason it is also a valuable feature when auctioning regional licenses, which is the norm
in many countries outside Europe.
In my view Cramton’s emphasis on the importance of price discovery is well-founded. Mo-
bile network operators bidding for the spectrum licenses have only educated guesses about
the technology available to them in five years time, and with licenses being handed out for
decades at a time, this results in a severe lack of information about the license’s value over
the whole relevant time period. In a sealed bid auction, such as the previously introduced
VCG mechanism, bidders only have this educated guess to work with and thus might severely
over- or undervalue the licenses. In more recent auctions, thanks to a change in legislation
in certain countries such as France, price discovery has also allowed bidder to asses roaming
opportunities. If roaming on other operators’ networks is allowed then an operator can prefer
to drop out of the auction when the prices become high and instead rent the spectrum from
other operators.
A lack of price discovery can also cause mistakes by the bidders where they underestimate
the competition in the case when the number of bidders is not known. This happened in
Norway where one of the incumbent operators, not knowing a fourth operator had decided
to participate in the auction, severely underestimated the price for the licenses and ended up
without any spectrum, essentially forcing the company, Tele2, to sell all its assets in Norway.
This is quite a unique scenario (it has happened only once in Europe during the last five
years) and it can equally well be blamed on the Norwegian regulator for using a first price
sealed bid auction which created an incentive for the bidders to severely understate their
values. Nevertheless, it would have been avoided if an ascending-bid format was used.
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The majority of price discovery is made irrelevant if bidders are allowed to stay inactive
for most of the auction, only to start bidding later when the auction is drawing to a close. If
all bidders act this way the auction could also take an unnecessarily long time to complete.
To ensure price discovery and to end the auction in a reasonable time, activity rules, devised
by Milgrom and Wilson, have been used (McAfee and McMillan, 1996). In their simplest
form they simply state that a bidder cannot increase his demand during an auction. After
the first round of an auction, each bidder can only bid on the same amount, or less, licenses
as he bid in the first round. Such rule ensures that bidders are showing their truthful demand
across the whole duration of the auction27.
Ascending-bid format is not without its critics. Klemperer (2002) argues that (i) ascending
auctions are very vulnerable to collusion28 and (ii) ascending auctions are very likely to deter
entry. Much of the issues that relate to collusion pointed out by Klemperer have already
been accounted for in recent auctions. One of the main innovations regulators have come
up with has been reducing information available to bidders (e.g. hiding bidder identities
and the amount of bidders) to make punishment strategies harder to execute. Further still,
regulators no longer allow bidders to submit their own bids (as this allowed bidders to send
numerical messages to each other within the auction software) but instead have to either
choose from a menu of predetermined increments or, in the case of clock auctions, the price
increase is set by the auctioneer.
It is not enough that licenses are offered for sale simultaneously. To function properly,
and to live up to its name, a simultaneous auction requires a simultaneous stopping rule
which allows bidding to continue on each license until there is no excess demand on any li-
cense. This allows bidders to flexibly change their demanded licenses as prices evolve. When
a price on certain license rises too high, a bidder is free to start competing for a different,
cheaper license that has so far been uninteresting to bidders.
Simultaneous auction is superior to its alternative, auctioning each license sequentially
(McMillan, 1994). Particularly when auctioning spectrum licenses, sequential auctions im-
pede aggregation and use of backup strategies. A firm might have been willing to bid more
27Without an activity rule the revealed demand curve could look upward sloping: an operator started by
bidding on a single license but after the prices of other licenses went up he increased his demand!
28The advantages of a sealed-bid auction in the case where bidder collusion is anticipated was already
pointed out in McMillan (1994)
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(or less) for early licenses had it seen how bidders behave in the later stages. Predatory
bidding is possible as bidders might drive the prices for first licenses up making the winners
unable to compete for later products29. Regret is also a problem, since the final prices often
vary from auction to auction30 and there will probably be a bidder that ended up paying
more than necessary for one of the earlier goods.
A short theoretical and non-strategic analysis of simultaneous ascending auctions will be
provided here. The theory concerns the convergence of prices and quantities towards a
competitive equilibrium in a similar fashion as Walrasian tatonnement31. The introduced
notation will be used later to illustrate the various issues that prevent simultaneous ascending
auction models from reaching a competitive equilibrium. The notation is somewhat similar
to one used in previous section and follows that used in Milgrom (2004). Assume there are
still N bidders and that L is a set of available licenses with a typical subset S. Bidder i can
be seen as receiving an allocation xi which is a vector consisting of 0
′s and 1′s describing
some subset S. Bidder’s payoff is then the value of licenses acquired minus the transfer
paid for said licenses, just as in the VCG setting. The difference is that now the transfers
ti(xi) are the determined by bidder i’s bids. The payoff can be written as vi(xi)− ti(xi) and
hence the problem bidder faces each round can be written as bidders demand correspondence
Di(t) = argmaxxivi(xi)− tkni (xi). The transfer tkni (xi) is a personalized price for bidder i at
round n on license k. It is the high bid if bidder i is the standing high bidder on said license,
or the high bid plus one increment  > 0 otherwise. A bidder is said to bid straightforwardly
if during each round he bids according to his demand correspondence.
Milgrom (2004) shows that under general conditions the auction outcome will be an almost
competitive equilibrium, with the difference between the final outcome and the competitive
equilibrium being at most one bid increment . The underlying condition for the above to
hold is that goods are substitutes for bidder i, meaning that increasing the prices of other
29Binmore and Klemperer (2002) wrote about a tragicomic example of this. In the Turkish 3G spectrum
auction two equal licenses were sold sequentially and bidders were allowed to only obtain one license each.
The problem arose when officials ruled that the reserve price on the second auction will be set at the clearing
price of the first. This resulted in one operator bidding more than anyone else could afford on the first
license, resulting in the second license going unsold and the winner of the first license receiving a monopoly.
30Salant (2014) discusses this in chapters 6 and 7 of his book.
31Le´on Walras suggested that an equilibrium can be achieved through ”trial and error” (which is the
translation of tatonnement from French). Different prices would be posted by auctioneer, which would be
met by different demands, but no transactions would be made until supply was equal to demand.
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goods l (l 6= k) does not decrease the demand of good k. Formally, this condition can be
written as (k ∈ Di(t), tk = t′k, t′l ≥ tl) ⇒ k ∈ Di(t′). Straightforward bidding is a feasible
strategy for a bidder in each round of the auction if and only if the goods are substitutes for
said bidder. If the substitute condition holds true and all bidders bid in a straightforward
manner, the auction also ends in a finite number of rounds after no new bids are made. The
last condition needed to ensure that an almost competitive equilibrium exists is that bidders
have strictly positive marginal values.
4.4.2 Reserve prices
The importance of seller revenues is a controversial topic in spectrum auction design. Most
governments deny having revenue goals in spectrum auctions or subject them to fulfilling
other, efficiency related, goals first (Klemperer, 2002). Still, setting the right reserve price is
essential.
First, the reserve price can have drastic effects on seller revenues. Whenever there is uncer-
tainty in the number of bidders the reserve price should be set close to the predicted sales
price. A disastrous example of not doing so was seen in Swiss 3G spectrum auction in 2000.
The number of bidders turned out to be much less than anticipated and only four bidders
participated to bid for four licenses. It goes without saying that the auction ended after the
first round. In recent spectrum auctions the amount of bidders has also typically been low
as a result of consolidation in the market and reserve prices often dictate the sale price.
Setting reserve prices too low also increases the incentives for predation and incentivizes
collusion that might otherwise not be profitable. Incentives created by a low reserve price
can be demonstrated with a simple example. Assume there are six identical licenses for sale
and three bidders. Two bidders demand two licenses each, but there is a third bidder that
would like to have three licenses. Two bidders value each license at 35. The third bidder
each license at 50. Constant marginal utilities are assumed for simplicity here. In the first
case, auctioneer has set the reserve price at 10. Bidder three then has two choices. He can
settle for two licenses, in which case the auction ends immediately and he receives a net
benefit of 2 ∗ (50− 10) = 80, or he can outbid one of the other two bidders for third license.
Since the licenses are identical, bidding for a third license also increases the prices for all
other licenses sold in the auction. Bidder three has to bid at least 35 on three licenses to
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obtain them, resulting in a net benefit of 3 ∗ (50 − 35) = 45 < 80. He would then be much
better off not competing for the last license.
Let’s now look at case two, where the auctioneer has attempted to predict bidder values
and set the reserve price at 30. Doing the same calculations as before, settling with two
licenses gives bidder three a net benefit of 2 ∗ (50− 30) = 40 while competing for a third li-
cense results in 3∗(50−35) = 45 > 40. Depending on the reserve price, bidder three behaves
differently and the auction ends in a different allocation, the latter being the efficient one.
This phenomenon is more generally called demand reduction and goes beyond depending
simply on reserve prices. It will be discussed further in section 5.1.
Setting reserve prices too high has the obvious drawback of resulting in unsold spectrum. It
is also important that the auctioneer can commit to the reserve prices it sets. If the prices
are high and the commitment is weak, bidder could strategically withdraw from bidding in
a hope that the unsold licenses will be re-auctioned at lower prices. This is especially risky
when bidders know the total number of bidders participating in the auction and when each
bidder is guaranteed spectrum in the auction.
4.4.3 Other rules
Adding to the above, there are a number of other rules that, while almost universally em-
ployed in spectrum auctions, might differ a bit between auctions. Cramton (2002) lists these
as spectrum cap, payment rules, bid increments and bid information. These have varying
effects on spectrum auctions depending on how they are implemented.
Spectrum caps limit the amount of spectrum a single bidder can win. They are used almost
universally32, although they might differ from auction to auction. The benefits of spectrum
cap are all related to post-auction competition between MNOs and hence they need to be
chosen differently for different markets. For the auction process itself, they are burden. First
of all, spectrum caps forcibly ”cut off” the tails of participants’ demand curves making them
unable to bid according to their true demand on all the available licenses. Focusing only on
the auction and ignoring any welfare gains from added competition in the consumer market,
this rule might violate the efficiency of the outcome.
32The only exceptions involve auctioning high frequency spectrum which is far less valuable, for which
there is significantly less demand, and which could not unbalance the competition in consumer market
35
Another possible issue is that a low spectrum cap can make the whole auction process
obsolete. This issue can be demonstrated in a situation where six licenses are auctioned
to three bidders33. If the auctioneer wants to encourage equal competition in the telecom
market he will set the spectrum cap at two licenses. However, unless the licenses differ from
each other, such a cap causes the auction to end immediately. Spectrum caps also often
guarantee bidders at least some spectrum, which can incentivize demand reduction, to be
discussed later.
Two kinds of payment rules have been used in spectrum auctions. In the first one the win-
ning bidders have to pay the license fee in full within a short time following the concluded
auction. The second type has the winners making their payments in several installments,
usually over several years. Paying over time allows for winning MNOs to use more resources
on building infrastructure needed to roll out their service. It also reduces the risk that
bidders will be budget constrained in an auction. However, these positive qualities have a
negative side as well. Would be budget constrained firms could be risky ventures. Moving a
significant part of the payments into the future also probably increases the final prices in the
auction, as the discounted present value of the payments is lower than the value of winning
bids. These two combined can lead to winners defaulting on their payments34.
How bid increments are chosen can play a vital role in the auction. In the first spec-
trum auctions bidders were allowed to decide on their own bids. This lead to bidders tacitly
colluding with each other using for example bids ending in specific numbers as messages.
Tacit collusion35 can be a severe problem in spectrum auctions and it is closely linked to
the strategic demand reduction. Parties engaging in tacit collusion often aim at keeping the
licenses prices low by avoiding (unnecessary) competition.
Free choice of bid increments also allowed bidders to stall the auction at will by using very
33This is becoming the standard in Europe, where 700 MHz band, which will be auctioned next, is divided
into six licenses and most of European countries currently have three active operators.
34FCC (1995) arranged an auction to encourage entrepreneurship by setting the payment period to 10
years. $10 billion worth of licenses were sold, but $8.2 billion worth of those were affected by default
(Campbell, 2013).
35Explicit collusion, which takes the form of negotiating with other bidders over the strategies exercised
in the auction, is prohibited under the competition law in practically all countries much the same way as
forming cartels is prohibited.
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small increments to outbid each other. Mainly for these two reasons more recent spectrum
auctions have opted for either giving bidders a menu of bids they can choose from, say a
choice of outbidding standing high bidder by 5%, 10% or 15%, or the auctioneer calls the
prices altogether. The latter is used both in clock auction as well as in its combinatorial
variant.
Hiding bidder’s information during an auction serves a similar purpose as predetermining the
bid increments: it reduces the possibility for bidders to collude with each other (Klemperer,
2002). By hiding the standing high bidder’s identity it becomes considerably harder to, for
example, execute punishment strategies. It is also common to hide the number of bidders
participating in an auction to create uncertainty among bidders whether they are guaranteed
to obtain a certain amount of spectrum or not. Such uncertainty makes it riskier to engage
in activities like demand reduction. When no information about the numbers or identities
of bidders is disclosed, the simultaneous ascending auction provides minimal information
and is strategically equivalent to a VCG mechanism (Milgrom, 2004). However, by doing
this auctioneer also hampers price discovery. Hence this rule is a trade-off between collusion
avoidance and price discovery. Hence different auctioneers have opted for different rules. For
example German regulator published practically all information in its 2015 auction, while
Finnish regulator chose to hide all information regarding the number and identity of bidders
in its 2013 auction. Said choices can be explained by observing the auctioned licenses. Price
discovery was probably more important in the German auction where four, two of which
completely new, different bands of spectrum were on sale simultaneously.
5 Issues unsolved by spectrum auction models
Even though the models presented in previous section address certain shortcomings of the
Vickrey auction, they are not by any means perfect. I will now present issues that the
auctioneer has to address or at least acknowledge when organizing a spectrum auction. I
explain what causes these issues and whether they can be mitigated.
Multi-unit auctions can be divided into two categories based on participants having single-
unit 36 or multi-unit demand. Most spectrum auctions involve participants with multi-unit
36Single-unit demand can be real or artificial. An example of an artificial single-unit demand is the UK
3G spectrum auction where spectrum cap was set to one block per participant, essentially leading to them
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demands, creating challenges to the policy maker.
In the case of single-unit demand, no synergies, and homogeneous goods a spectrum auction
is relatively simple to arrange since a uniform price auction is efficient. Each bidder has
a dominant strategy of placing a bid equal to his value for the item sold (Milgrom, 2004)
since, in a VCG fashion, their bids don’t affect their payments. Enforcing single-unit de-
mands allows auctioneer to focus on issues like facilitating entry, and can thus sometimes be
beneficial (Binmore and Klemperer, 2002). The reason enforced single-unit demands are rare
in modern spectrum auctions is auctioneers’ willingness to allow MNOs to choose their own
allocation. Especially in multi-band auctions it is practically impossible for the auctioneer
to know the exact packages the bidders demand, hence preemptively packaging the licenses
would partly destroy the purpose of running the auction.
5.1 Strategic demand reduction
Complications arise when bidders demand more than one unit even when assuming homo-
geneous goods. In auctions with multi-unit demand bidders generally express the amount
demanded at each given price or, alternatively, bid separately for each subsequent unit. The
most notable problem is the lack of unambiguous dominant strategy, as even in a uniform
price auction the bidder might not want to express his true demand curve due to a phe-
nomenon called strategic demand reduction.
Strategic demand reduction occurs when a bidder finds it beneficial to shade his real de-
mand. It is commonplace in uniform price auctions, but also occurs in simultaneous ascend-
ing auctions where goods do not have to be identical. As long as bidders demand multiple
units and have non-increasing marginal values there is an incentive to bid less than bidders’
value on said units (Milgrom, 2004). More precisely, in every undominated equilibrium of a
uniform price auction bidders bid their real value on the first unit, but shade their bids on
every subsequent unit (Krishna, 2009).
Strategic demand reduction has become increasingly important issue in European spec-
trum auctions where the amount of bidders attending the auctions has been steadily falling
having single-unit demand.
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throughout the 21st century. In early 00s spectrum auctions could involve as many as six
bidders, allowing policy makers to set a spectrum cap of one license, effectively forcing bid-
ders into a single unit demand setting. Nowadays the telecom markets commonly involve
only three or four competing operators. At the same time the amount of spectrum available
to MNOs has increased, making demand reduction a valid strategy for profit maximizing
bidders.
Ausubel and Cramton (2002) show that not only do bidders with multi-unit demand have an
incentive to reduce demand, but this demand reduction also necessarily leads to inefficiency
where, with positive probability, every equilibrium of a uniform price auction is ex-post in-
efficient. Ausubel and Cramton illustrate their inefficiency theorem using a simple example
with two identical licenses and two bidders with independent private values x1 and x2 for
each license. Bidder one demands only a single license while bidder two demands up to two
licenses with constant marginal value x2. x1 and x2 are drawn from a uniform distribution
[0, 1]. The auction in question is k + 1th price auction where k refers to the number of li-
censes sold. In the case of this example this results in the winner paying the third highest bid.
As stated above, it is a weakly dominant strategy to bid one’s true value on the first li-
cense. Hence we need to analyze bidder two’s bid on the second license. Bidder two’s
expected profit can be written as a function of his bid on the second license b2.
pi(b2) = (x2 − b2)(1− b2) +
∫ b2
0
2(x2 − s)ds
Where the first part represents bidder two’s payoff when winning one license (the probability
of this happening is 1 − b2) and the second part represents payoff from winning the second
license. Solving the integral and rearranging gives
pi(b2) = (x2 − b2)(1− b2)− b2(b2 − 2x2)
= x2 − x2b2 − b2 + b22 − b22 + 2x2b2
= x2 − b2(1− x2)
Taking a derivative with respect to b2 gives
∂pi(b2)
∂b2
= x2 − 1 ≤ 0 since x2 ≤ 1
Setting b2 = 0 maximizes bidder two’s payoff regardless of his value. Bidder two then only
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bids on one license, resulting in both bidders winning their license free of charge and the
auctioneer receiving zero profit. In this rather extreme example the auction fails not only in
generating profit but also in efficiency, as it could very well be that x2 > x1 yet bidder two
would still only want to bid on one license.
While Ausubel and Cramton analyze uniform price auctions where bidders express their
demand curves, they emphasize that the results are applicable in general to auctions that
have an equilibrium with a uniform price character. Hence we can generalize their results
to auctions like SMRA and Clock Auction, which while not perfect uniform price auctions,
have historically resulted in equilibria with similar blocks clearing at almost identical prices.
Demand reduction is most severe when when the number of bidders is small compared to the
number of licenses sold (Krishna, 2009). Hence the impact from demand reduction decreases
as the number of bidders grows.
One way to address demand reduction would be to design the auction in a way that forces
bidders to have a single unit demand. We will see that this in fact solves a good number
of issues presented in this section, but does so at possible expense of an efficient allocation,
substitutability and price discovery.
5.2 Complementary goods and their implications
Spectrum blocks can be thought of as being complements in two ways. First, due to current
technology, two contiguous blocks provide operators with more capacity than two separate
blocks, making contiguous blocks on the same band complements while other blocks remain
substitutes. Second, especially in large spectrum auctions involving many spectrum bands,
blocks from different bands can be thought of as complements. This can generally be as-
sumed to apply to all operators who attend spectrum auctions. Since Vickrey originally
assumed monotonically non-increasing marginal values in his original case of multiple ho-
mogeneous goods (Ausubel and Milgrom, 2006), this complementary between goods violates
the assumptions behind VCG mechanism.
Furthermore, since only contiguous blocks are complements we cannot simply assume that
acquiring additional blocks would make all other blocks increasingly more valuable. We
have to instead assume that acquiring additional contiguous blocks is makes all other con-
tiguous more valuable. This currently applies to blocks on all bands. For the policy maker
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complementary goods imply several problems, which are discussed below.
5.2.1 Exposure risk
Exposure risk37 refers to a situation where a bidder is left with only one license after bidding
more than his value on it in order to capture significant synergies for obtaining numerous
licenses (Kagel and Levin, 2005). Exposure risk can only appear when the products sold
have synergies, bidders demand multiple units, and bidding for packages is not allowed. An
extreme example is a situation where some minimum amount of spectrum is required to
operate profitably, but the bidder has been outbid on all other licenses except for one or two.
Since withdrawing bids is not usually allowed the bidder is stuck with unwanted licenses
for as long as someone overbids him. Such extreme exposure risk is less common in Europe
where licenses are nationwide and often auctioned one or two bands at a time, in which
case they act as extra capacity to incumbent operators and are not essential for staying in
business. Large multi-band auctions, such as the German spectrum auction in 201538, where
practically all licenses on all bands are auctioned simultaneously form an exception to this.
A less extreme, and much more common, situation is one where operators are attempt-
ing to obtain two or more contiguous licenses in an auction that does not allow bidding for
packages. A simple example can be used to illustrate the problem. Lets assume an ascending
bid auction where a bidder one demands two products that have synergies. His utilities are
U1(A) = a, U1(B) = b, and U1(AB) = a + b + c. A situation could arise where bidder
one is standing high bidder on A with a bid of a, and bidder two has a standing high bid
b on license B. It would be rational for for bidder one to overbid bidder two on license B
by bidding b + 0.5c since he values combination AB at a + b + c and at a combined price
of a + b + 0.5c his payoff would be 0.5c. However, after overbidding bidder two, he might
himself get overbid on license A by someone bidding a+ c or more on it. In such a situation
bidder one no longer finds it profitable to bid for license A since bidding anything over a+ c
would make his payoff negative despite the synergies. However, he is stuck paying b + 0.5c
for license B even though he values said license at b. Unless someone overbids him, he will
receive a negative payoff from the auction due to realized exposure risk. This example is
closely tied to the fact that no competitive equilibrium exists in the case of synergies as I
37The exposure risk is often referred to as aggregation risk in regulatory texts.
38To cope with exposure risk German auctioneer allowed bidders to withdraw bids. Bidder that withdrew
bids was required to pay the difference between the realized final price and his own bid prior to withdrawal,
if it difference was negative.
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explain below in section 5.2.2 .
Even this less extreme type of exposure risk is regarded as a serious problem. Hence it
has often been addressed by either allowing withdrawal of standing high bids or by en-
abling standing high bidders to flexibly switch their bids to other licenses. (Cramton, 2006).
Switching between licenses solves the issue when synergy comes from obtaining contiguous
blocks as it can prevent the bidder from being stuck on separated licenses.
5.2.2 Lack of competitive equilibrium
In section 4.4.1 I wrote how simultaneous ascending auctions can achieve an almost com-
petitive equilibrium under general conditions. The underlying assumption for the proofs
was that the auctioned licenses should be substitutes to each of the bidders for them to bid
straightforwardly. If this is not the case, Milgrom (2000) shows that the existence of com-
petitive equilibrium cannot be guaranteed. While the proof will be omitted here, Milgrom
offers a simple example that provides intuition for his result.
Start with a setting with two bidders and two licenses. Assume again that there is one bidder
for whom the licenses are complements, i.e. U1(A) = a, U1(B) = b, and U1(AB) = a+ b+ c,
where c > 0. For the second bidder the goods are substitutes and his values are assumed
as U2(A) = a + 0.6c, U2(B) = b + 0.6c, and U2(AB) = a + b. If we suppose there exists a
competitive equilibrium both goods go to bidder one since the allocation must be efficient.
However then the prices pA ≥ a+0.6c and pB ≥ b+0.6c which implies pAB ≥ a+b+1.2c. At
this price pAB bidder one is not willing to buy the package and hence competitive equilibrium
prices do not exist.
The above example is also tied to the idea of no regret that exists only when licenses are sub-
stitutes. As long as there is no complementarity a bidder following a straightforward bidding
strategy will never face a situation where he would regret a bid he made previously. With
complementarity involved bidder might regret his previous bids and this effectively removes
the guarantee of a competitive equilibrium existing. If in the above example bidder one tried
competing against bidder two by bidding straightforwardly he would have to bid over a or b
on the respective licenses. However, he will never be willing to bid more than a + 0.6c and
b+ 0.6c on both licenses. By bidding straightforwardly auction would end with both bidders
getting one license and bidder one having a negative payoff. Straightforward bidding is thus
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unfeasible and this severely complicates bidder’s strategy and introduces uncertainty.
5.2.3 Ensuring contiguous allocation
The original Simultaneous Multiple-Round Auction used to auction spectrum did not allow
standing high bidders to switch their bids. This lead to problems dubbed as exposure risk
and fragmentation risk39.
Fragmentation risk, while similar to exposure risk, refers to a more specific situation where
a bidder obtains spectrum licenses that are not contiguous. As this is inefficient use of
spectrum, it is in direct conflict with one of the main objectives of the auctioneer. Pareto
improvements could be made by simply switching around the licenses between winners, but
fragmentation often occurs in situations where only one of the bidders has incentives to
change allocation while other two are completely satisfied with their current licenses and
hence indifferent (or sometimes reluctant) to switch. Such a scenario is depicted in figure
3 with three bidders bidding on six licenses. Each color represents the licenses bidders ac-
quired in the final allocation. Only the green bidder (and the auctioneer) is unhappy with
the allocation.
Figure 3: Fragmented allocation of licenses.
To achieve efficient use of spectrum, and to allow bidders to reap the benefits of comple-
mentarity, policy makers want to ensure that contiguous allocation of spectrum blocks will
be achieved during an auction. The spectrum auction designers have approached this issue
in four different ways.
First way is to auction the licenses as generic blocks, assuming them to be identical during
39These risks were already identified in the original SMRA model, but were accepted as necessary due to
lack of tools to overcome them (McMillan (1994) and McAfee and McMillan (1996)).
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the auction. This approach is by far the most simple and effective, but can only be used with-
out downsides when the licenses on sale are similar enough. Still, its use is advised whenever
possible (Cramton, 2013). Small differences can be accounted for in the assignment round,
which is often held after the number of licenses each bidder wins has been determined in the
initial auction. Assignment rounds are single round sealed-bid second price auctions where
the highest bidders gets to choose their allocation first while paying the second highest bid.
When the licenses sold are identical the assignment round can be replaced with the auction-
eer choosing the final allocation by himself. This was the case in German 2015 spectrum
auction40.
Second way is to allow the participating bidders to switch their standing high bids from one
license to another during an auction round. It helps prevent bidders from getting ”stuck” on
separated blocks. This so called augmented switching rule is often used in SMRA auctions
that involve heterogeneous licenses and hence cannot be run using generic blocks. Multi-band
auctions involve by definition such licenses and thus augmented switching rule is common in
those. It also allows bidders to better substitute their planned licenses for another similarly
valuable package which might be cheaper at a time, a feature important especially in multi-
band auctions. Allowing standing high bidder to switch his bid to other license can create
new problems for the auction. Hence a regulator should carefully analyze the need for such
rule.
Third way is to allow bidders to bid for packages, in which case they either receive the
package they bid for or nothing at all. Both clock auction and combinatorial clock auc-
tion models incorporate this in a sense that bidders are expressing their demand for the
licenses separately each round. Hence if the auctioneer raises prices to a point where neither
a package nor an individual license is longer attractive, bidders can simply choose to exit
the auction. Same applies to the supplementary round in CCA model, where bidders can
express their demands for different packages simultaneously. As was discussed in 4.3, allow-
ing package bids when complementarity is present can result in the auction outcome being
outside core.
Fourth way is to preemptively package the licenses, or set the spectrum cap, in a way that
40German regulator actually gave operators one month to decide the allocation by themselves. Having
failed to achieve a consensus the regulator then assigned the licenses to them.
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bidders are left with a single unit demand, hence essentially removing the need to worry
about fragmentation and exposure risk altogether. This is a good choice when the auction
participants and the final allocation can be predicted with near certainty. While predicting
the final allocation is not easy, there are certain cases where it rather obvious assuming that
all licenses are sold. First it should be noted that predicting is easier in the case of single
band auctions below 1000 MHz. These usually have six licenses for sale. In an example
of four bidders and with bidders capable of obtaining only two licenses, the only possible
allocation is for two bidders to obtain two licenses and the remaining two obtaining only
one. In such a case the auctioneer can design the auction in a way that there are only
four licenses on sale, and each participant is allowed to obtain at most one license. Such
an approach was taken with good results by Ofcom in the UK 3G auction (Klemperer, 2002).
By preemptively packaging the licenses the auctioneer does not only fix the issues regarding
contiguous allocation but also a majority of other issues such as ensuring the outcome being
in the core and the auction having a competitive equilibrium. It does however reduce substi-
tution among licenses and can lead to a different, potentially inefficient41, outcome. Unless
the licenses are homogeneous, the auctioneer probably cannot know which bidder wants
which frequencies. A situation might arise where a bidder is willing to get two licenses and
thus would want to bid for the larger package, but at the same time he would prefer to have
the frequencies sold as smaller package. Regardless of his willingness to pay, auction design
prevents him from receiving a satisfactory allocation. Nevertheless, enforcing a single-unit
demand upon the participants should always be considered.
5.3 Common values and imperfect information
It is rational to assume that in spectrum auctions bidders have common values since spec-
trum has the same properties for each auction participant. However, some differences in
bidder values may occur based on the previous holdings of spectrum the bidders have. For
example, high frequency spectrum might be more valuable to a bidder who previously has
obtained mostly low frequencies and would want to provide more capacity in densely popu-
lated areas. In such case we talk about bidders having almost common, or interdependent42,
41The concept of efficiency can become messy at this point. The outcome of an auction with preemptively
packaged licenses might be efficient on its own, but the outcome might differ from an auction where all
minimum-sized licenses are made available. Only smallest effective license sizes should be considered when
discussing efficiency of an allocation.
42A bidder with interdependent values has a common component and a private component.
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values.
In addition to common or interdependent values bidders probably have imperfect infor-
mation in regards to their own values. Predicting the value of the licenses is difficult due
to them being awarded for a long period of time in an industry that is constantly evolving.
Hence bidders might have different ex-ante values, even if the values end up being same
ex-post. A particularly sad example of MNOs misvaluing licenses was seen in the German
3G spectrum spectrum auction in 2000 where two winners, Mobilcomm and Group3G, never
used the spectrum they paid $8 billion for as they found that investing in infrastructure
would no longer be profitable due to changes in technology (Salant, 2014).
In common value auctions with imperfect information, such as the German example above,
winners are those that are most optimistic about the values. Since bidders tend to realize
this, they adjust their bidding accordingly. As mentioned earlier as an argument for using
open ascending auctions, the effects of winner’s curse can be corrected when more informa-
tion is made available during the auction itself.
Interdependent values cause problems to auction mechanisms that according to Krishna
(2009) can be insurmountable especially in a multi-unit case. Most notable Morgan (2001)
has shown that when there are three or more bidders whose values are interdependent an
ascending auction (or a Vickrey auction for that matter) need not result in an efficient
allocation.
5.4 Budget constrained bidders
When bidders face binding budget constraints the dominant strategy property of sealed-bid
second price auction such as the VCG mechanism and the supplementary phase of CCA
no longer necessarily hold43. Ausubel and Milgrom (2002) demonstrate the issue through
an example where there are three bidders and two goods. Bidder 1 demands two goods at
price 10 each and has a budget constraint of 12, while bidder 2 demands one good at price
8. Bidder 3 demands either one good at a price of 11 or nothing at all. Bidder 3’s decision
43The effects of budget constraints on sequential multi-unit auctions are analyzed extensively in Jean-
Pierre Benoˆıt (2001). In sequential auctions bidders can have an incentive to attempt to deplete other
bidder’s budget in order to obtain goods cheaper in later auctions. However, since sequential auctions are
not used to auction spectrum, more detailed analysis will be omitted here.
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depends on exogenous factors.
Due to budget constraint limiting bidder 1’s bid for the package at 1.2, bidder 1 has no
dominant strategy in such a situation. Instead, bidder 1’s optimal bid depends on the deci-
sion made by bidder 3. Assume that bidder 2 bids 8 according to his optimal strategy. If
bidder 3 bids 11, bidder 1 wants to bid more than 8 on a single good to obtain it. If instead
bidder 3 does not bid anything, bidder 1 would want to bid less than 4 for a single license
and 12 for the package. In both cases bidder 1 would end up paying a total of 8, yet his
strategies are inconsistent.
Ausubel (2004) has devised an efficient ascending bid auctions, dubbed Ausubel auction,
which mitigates issues caused by budget constraints. Ausubel auction has no simultaneous
ending rule. Instead, licenses are awarded whenever they are ”clinched”. In a six license auc-
tion, bidder i clinches a license whenever total demand excluding i drops below six. Hence,
even if bidder i would end up bidding less on the remaining five licenses, he would still be
guaranteed at least one. Ausubel auction results in the same outcome as VCG mechanism
when bidder values are private, and may still result in an efficient outcome when bidder val-
ues are interdependent. However, it never gained popularity among spectrum auctioneers.
Possible explanation could be that said model only works for identical goods. Furthermore,
regulators might actually not consider budget constraints a problem.
This is because in reality bidders participating in spectrum auctions are rarely truly bud-
get constrained, or at very least their budget constraint does not bind. Even in Poland’s
case, where the highest grossing European spectrum of this decade concluded in 2015, it is
doubtful that budget constraints were an issue for the bidders. Orange Poland, which ob-
tained most licenses in the auction, paid PLN 3.2 billion (≈ e0.75 billion) for them. Orange
Poland’s operating income of PLN 1.0 billion means they could pay for the 20 year license
investment in almost three years all by themselves. Here I don’t even consider the fact that
Orange Poland is a part of multinational Orange Group which had operating income of e4.7
billion, which in amounts for PLN 20.2 billion. Even the smaller national MNOs were hardly
taking a huge risk, since Cyfrowy Polsat, which spent PLN 2.2 billion in the auction, had
operating profit of PLN 1.4 billion in year 201444.
44These numbers were taken from Orange Poland’s financial statement (Poland, 2014), Orange groups
financial statement(Group, 2014), and Cyfrowy Polsat financial statement (Polsat, 2014)
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The case for non-binding budget constraint is even stronger in other European spectrum
auctions. For example, in Finnish 2013 spectrum auction six licenses were auctioned for
e16.67 - e22.2 million euros each while smallest of the winning MNOs, DNA, had an op-
erating profit of e43.7 million in the same year (DNA, 2013). In essence, DNA could have
financed the auction with operating profits from the same year.
In some countries (e.g. Finland) regulators have attempted to further loosen any possi-
ble budget constraints by allowing the winners to pay their winning bids over time. This can
eliminate situations where a bidder would have to drop out due to not having enough money
to pay for the license immediately after the auction while regarding winning at current prices
profitable over time. However, it is arguable that this could ever be an issue since companies
should be able to get funding for a profitable investment.
Acknowledging the above we can assume that bidders participating in European spectrum
auctions are probably not budget constrained and hence it should not be taken into too
much consideration when designing the auction.
5.5 Facilitating competition
Attracting enough participants is essential for every auction designer and it was the most
important goal for early European spectrum auction designers (Klemperer, 2002). Not only
does an auction with too few bidders run a risk of being unprofitable (Bulow and Klemperer,
1996), but it might end up in an inefficient allocation due to demand reduction. Addition-
ally an auction with few bidders certainly results in a market with few companies possibly
forming socially inefficient oligopolies45.
Attracting participants is not easy. Ascending auctions are especially poor in facilitating
competition as they often contribute to entry deterrence and predatory behavior and thus
discourage participation. Furthermore, entering a telecom market is not only about acquir-
ing spectrum, but entrants are required to invest heavily in the infrastructure as well. Thus
incumbents have a large advantage regardless of auction used and participating might be
unprofitable for outsiders, even when they are guaranteed spectrum through set-asides and
45As stated previously, telecommunications industry might in fact be a natural oligopoly (or even a
monopoly) due to overlapping infrastructure requirements.
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spectrum caps.
Nevertheless, the rewards for successfully attracting entrants are considerable. First, it can
reduce the possibility for bidders exercising demand reductions. It also allows the auctioneer
to simplify the auction in manners discussed above. Second, revenue oriented governments
will profit much more from an auction with four or more participants. Due to the way spec-
trum is divided into licenses, European spectrum auctions experience a considerable price
increase when moving from three to four bidders.
The common way to compare final prices between countries is through a Price per MHzPop
measure. This measure is obtained by standardizing the final prices to make comparisons
between countries feasible. Price per MHzPop is obtained by dividing the total clearing price
of an auction by the product of country’s population and the total MHz of spectrum sold.
Formally
Price per MHzPop =
Total clearing price
Total MHz sold ∗ Country’s population
Even after accounting for different populations, comparing prices in different auctions is
not straightforward. Almost every auction depicted here is different despite same or similar
products being sold. For example, potential revenue for MNOs can differ from country to
country based on things like population density (low density increases infrastructure costs),
GDP per capita (poorer citizens have less money to spend on wireless services), and auction
model used. In figure 4 we can observe that the model used seems to have no significant
effect on the revenue, although with so few observations the results are vague at best. The
amount of observations (the number of spectrum auctions in Europe) is still insufficient
to conduct proper empirical analysis that would yield statistically significant outcomes for
relevant variables. The upcoming wave of spectrum auctions where licenses from 700 MHz
band will be awarded might change this and make analyzing factors that affect final prices
in spectrum auctions feasible in the future.
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Figure 4: Final prices of recent European 700, 800 and 900 MHz spectrum auctions.
Still, the positive effect that additional bidders have on final prices of an auction seems
evident. Figure 446 shows the clearing prices of recent comparable47 European spectrum
auctions for different amounts of bidders. There is huge price variation in auctions with 3
bidders, but almost none when there are 4 or 5. Latvian auction is a clear outlier, but it can
be explained by the fourth bidder registering but not actually bidding in the auction.
The price variation can probably be explained by the nature of the auctions and the major
role rules play when auction has only three participants. Auctions for 700 MHz and 800 MHz
spectrum bands that are included in the above figure were auctions of six licenses, a number
which is nicely divisible by number three. Hence it is meaningful to assume that demand
46The data on which the figure is based can be found in Appendix B.
47Auctions involving the sale of 700, 800 and 900 MHz licenses, which are considered technologically similar,
are included in the figure. Some CCA auctions included involved other bands as well. Clock auctions are
included under CCA auctions in case where licenses from a single band were auctioned.
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reduction has been an attractive option for bidders. It is possible that it was further helped
by strict spectrum caps which made competing for larger share difficult or impossible. As
was stated earlier, bidders are eager to engage in demand reduction only when they know
they are guaranteed at least some spectrum.
Thus the price increase when jumping from three to four bidder can be explained by bidders
having less chances to engage in demand reduction. In addition, bidders more clearly com-
pete for a dominating market position as some bidders will inevitably gain a larger share
of spectrum than others. Since bidders are thought to have almost common values and
declining marginal values (ignoring here that contiguous blocks are complements), we can
illustrate the price increase with a hypothetical example where all bidders have same values.
If we assume that bidders value the first license they receive at 5 and second at 2, having two
bidders in a three license auction would yield prices {2 + , 2 + , 2} where  > 0 represent
the minimum bid increment in an ascending auction. Having a third bidder would increase
the price on third license to 2 +  and having a fourth bidder would increase prices on all
licenses to 5, essentially almost tripling the seller revenue.
Additional bidders then increase the revenue for the auctioneer (a positive effect on so-
cial surplus) while increasing the prices bidders pay (a negative effect on social surplus).
While this surplus contribution of an entrant has been studied by (Milgrom, 2004) among
others, what really should interest the auctioneer is effect an entrant has when also taking
into account entrant’s effect on consumer market competition. Due to heavy infrastructure
requirements the industry has, this effect is ambiguous.
6 Auction design process
Organizing a spectrum auction consists of much more than simply choosing the mechanism,
yet most literature on the subject focuses on the characteristics of different mechanisms and
how bidders behave in them. In this section I review the auction design process as a way to
make the mechanism design itself easier. A well designed auction could by itself fix many of
the issues discussed previously and thus help achieve the objectives of awarding spectrum.
I start by presenting the auction design process widely followed by European spectrum auc-
tion organizers. I analyze the process focusing on how it succeeds at fixing and preventing
51
the shortcomings of the aforementioned spectrum auction models. I then follow a similar ap-
proach taken by Salant (2014) and review different cases of spectrum auctions held in Europe
to distinguish auction-improving choices from those that hinder the allocation process.
6.1 Overview of the process
The main objective of the spectrum auction design is to achieve the goals set by the gov-
ernment. These were discussed in section 2 and often include efficient use and allocation
of spectrum, promoting competition, and promoting broadband penetration. In addition,
these goals should be achieved in a manner that is fast, cheap and transparent.
The process as presented here is often taught to policy makers by international economics
consulting agencies48 and followed by most auctioneers. Its roots lie in the academic papers
written about the topic during the 90s and early 00s, all of which were already discussed in
this paper. It involves lawmaking, designing the products sold, choosing the auction model,
and lastly tailoring the model so that it best fits the setting it will be used in. Since all
spectrum awards are different the challenges faced by the auctioneer also differ from award
to award. By designing the auction properly the auctioneer can reduce the number of issues
he might encounter during the auctions itself. However, the auctioneer should also be care-
ful when attempting too clever designs, as these often complicate the auction and lead to
unforeseen, and often negative, outcomes.
The first spectrum auction design process has been thoroughly recorded by McMillan (1994).
Another thorough coverage of auction design process has been written by Klemperer (2002).
He discusses the 3G spectrum auction held in the United Kingdom in 2000. The UK policy
maker faced challenges different from the U.S. spectrum auctions held by the FCC, such
as the issue of promoting competition. A more recent paper has been written by Cramton
and Ockenfels (2014) who analyze the successfulness of mechanism design in the German 4G
auction held in 2010.
The design process itself starts with government identifying a need to award spectrum and
choosing what spectrum will be awarded. The regulator, who acts as the auctioneer, needs
to acknowledge what will be awarded and what goals the government wants to achieve. The
48Presentations by NERA economic consulting and Copenhagen Economics both advised similar design.
Presentations were held in IRG training workshop on Spectrum in August 25. - 27. 2015
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regulator has to be aware how different goals can require different mechanisms to be ful-
filled. For example, emphasizing monetary goals could radically change the auction design
as compared to putting emphasis only on efficiency. National laws also need to be taken in
to account as they dictate regulator’s ability to award spectrum. Hence while not always a
part of the process, lawmaking can be essential to the auctioneer. Some of the recent failed
auctions resulted from a combination of bad laws and auctioneer not making their auction
robust to them.
The process can be divided into three distinctive steps. The first step involves analyzing
the quality of the spectrum and choosing how to present it in the auction. This process
is called product design. There are a number of choices the auctioneer can make and they
mainly affect how contiguous allocation is achieved. First, auctioneer can choose the size of
a license. Technology dictates the most efficient license size49, but the auctioneer is free to
choose how many of these minimum sized licenses he ties together. This can be particularly
useful when it is possible to force the auction into a single unit demand setting as explained
in section 5.2.3.
Auctioneer can also choose whether to auction the licenses as concrete or as generic blocks
of spectrum. When the goods are almost identical, using generic licenses can significantly
simplify the process by allowing the use of a uniform price auction where bidders are only
required to submit the number of licenses demanded, with final allocation chosen in a sep-
arate process. Almost no additional rules are required when licenses are auctioned as generic.
The second step is choosing the auction model. Given the product design, auction model
choice is often straightforward. The first and most important factor is the number of spec-
trum bands present in the auction. When several bands are auctioned simultaneously it can
be beneficial to allow bidding for packages to avoid exposure risk. In such cases combinato-
rial clock auction is the leading option. If exposure risk is deemed insignificant due to for
example strict spectrum caps guaranteeing each participant enough spectrum, SMRA can
also be used. However while seemingly simple, SMRA can be strategically very complex
to participants as they are unable to express their demands for different combinations of
licenses simultaneously.
49The newest technology, 4G, best exploits two paired spectrum blocks sized 5 MHz.
53
Since CCA, and more specifically the Vickrey-nearest-core payment rule it employs, has
downsides it should not be used in other than multi-band auctions where exposure risk is
significant. When only a single band is auctioned the regulator can choose between SMRA
and clock auction. These two mechanisms lead to almost identical outcomes. However, when
goods sold are identical clock auction is both faster and simpler than SMRA (with generic
blocks) as bidders only express their amount demanded at different prices instead of actually
bidding on individual licenses. Furthermore, clock auction will end in uniform prices while
in SMRA prices could differ by at most one bid increment (Milgrom, 2004).
When licenses are heterogeneous and clock auction is used, the bidders have to express
their demand for each license individually just like in SMRA. The two models are sometimes
difficult to distinguish from each other since most regulators using SMRA have moved to
predetermining bid increments as in a clock auction. The only difference will be that in
clock auction bids are often not binding for future rounds. Hence auctioneer has a trade-off
between fixing exposure risk (clock auction) and reducing the probability that licenses end
up unsold (SMRA).
Auction design process is finalized by deciding on auction rules. This third step is focused
on bridging any gaps left over by the previous two steps. These include both universally
applied rules which were discussed in section 4.4 as well as situation specific rules such as
the augmented switching rule. Additional rules are often required when auctioning hetero-
geneous goods, hence they are more common in SMRA than other two models.
An important rule that is often omitted is one that makes offers binding in the broad mean-
ing of the word. While a bid is by definition usually50 binding for the round it is placed on
it might cease to bind in the following rounds for two reasons. First one was touched upon
earlier and is related to how clock auction treats each round separately. If not addressed
by limiting bidder’s ability to reduce demand during the auction it might result in unsold
spectrum. The second reason follows from allowing the standing high bidder to switch his
bid onto another license in an SMRA model. When an augmented switching rule is in place
it is essential to make bids binding.
50There are cases where even this was not completely true. Polish 2014/2015 and Czech 2012/2013 auctions
are two examples.
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A common way51 to achieve this is to make bidders who switch or withdraw their bids
pay the difference between the final price and their former bid, if the difference is positive.
A bidder who once bid a on a license and then switched or withdrew his bid would have to
pay max{a− b, 0}, where b is the final price for said license, as compensation. A lack of such
rule can make price discovery impossible and in the worst case allow the auction to continue
indefinitely.
6.2 Experiences from European spectrum auctions
Recent European spectrum auctions provide examples of spectrum auction design process
and how it can affect the outcome of a spectrum award. I analyze the auctions based on
auction regulation released by the national regulators (who acted as auctioneers) as well
as the auction outcomes and whatever other public information has been made available.
Theory and concepts covered earlier in this paper will be cited when analyzing the cases
and no new theory will be introduced. I focus on the design of the auction, specifically the
product design, model choice, and rules.
I present examples where through good product and rule design and a proper mechanism
choice the regulator managed to successfully reach their objectives. I also analyze auctions
where some objectives were not achieved and discuss how to avoid similar issues in the future.
The regulations and results for these auctions can be found in appendix A.
6.2.1 Austrian 2013 and Swiss 2012 auctions
Austrian 2013 multi-band auction acts as a model example of an appropriate mechanism
choice as well as well designed spectrum cap which enabled flexible substitution between
different license packages. I will analyze it together with Swiss 2012 auction. Both auctions
were very similar to each other with several bands being auctioned at the same, both us-
ing combinatorial clock auction model to run the auction, and both having three bidders
attending the auction. Despite notable similarities these two auctions ended up in two very
different allocations and raised a very different amount of revenue.
51Applied both in German 2015 auction and Australian 2016 auction
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I argue that the reason for different outcome was the spectrum cap, which was more lax
in the Austrian case. Austrian regulator ruled that a single bidder can obtain at most 2x35
MHz in the spectrum bands below 1000 MHz while the Swiss regulator capped bidders from
obtaining more than 2x25 MHz of spectrum below 1000 MHz. Another minor difference was
that in the Swiss auction two additional bands were auctioned as operators had a chance to
bid for spectrum on 2100 MHz and 2600 MHz bands.
Lax spectrum cap meant that bidders were much more free to compete for their desired
packages and the final allocation had two biggest MNOs, Telekom Austria and T-mobile,
share the most valuable 800 MHz band just between themselves. In Swiss case spectrum
cap forced bidders to end up with 20 MHz each on the 800 MHz band as attempting to
gain more would have forced them to forfeit licenses on almost equally important 900 MHz
band. The effect on social surplus of having one stronger (Telecom Austria received 43 % of
total spectrum) and two a bit weaker (T-mobile received 30 % and Three received 26 %)
operators is ambiguous. However it is inline with the theory of auctions that the bidder who
can best utilize the licenses, and thus willing to pay the most, receives the most licenses. In
my view the differences in spectrum shares post-auction is not large enough to considerably
hinder the competition in the consumer market.
What is not ambiguous is the effect the lax spectrum cap had on auction revenue. As
was shown in figure 4 the two auctions represented the opposite ends of the revenue raised in
auctions with three bidders. This can partly be explained by Swiss auction including cheap
high frequency spectrum. Due to the auction running the CCA model we cannot separate
the values for different bands. Hence the Price per MHzPop in the Swiss case has been
inflated by additional 250 MHz in the denominator. Still, even if we assume that the price
paid for this high frequency spectrum was zero and calculated the Price per MHzPop without
it, we would only be at 0.35 Price per MHzPop while the Austrian auction raised 0.85. The
remaining difference can be attributed to additional competition during the auction. The
benefits from slightly more even competition post-auction would need to be extremely high
to justify the several hundred million difference in auction revenue.
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6.2.2 French 2015 auction
In the French 2015 auction six licenses from 700 MHz band were for sale and four bidders
attended the auction. Since the licenses were nearly identical the national regulator Arcep
opted to use clock auction supplemented by an assignment round where bidders bid for the
right to choose their frequencies first. Hence each round the bidders only had to express their
demand in number of licenses. However, there remained the downside of the clock auction
where some spectrum might be left unsold.
Arcep fixed this problem by imposing an additional rule which (i) did not allow a single
bidder to contract his demand by more than one block per round and (ii) required the bid-
der contracting his demand to post a price which was above the price he bid in n−1th round
but below the nth round list price at which he would still be willing to buy the block. There-
fore in the case where two bidders simultaneously contract their demands the one posting
the higher price would get the block at said price. Such rule works especially well when there
is no exposure risk, meaning that an operator is happy with any number of licenses he will
receive and does not demand a minimum amount to operate profitably.
6.2.3 Finnish 2013 auction
In 2013 Finland auctioned six licenses from 800 MHz band. SMRA was chosen as the auc-
tion model and the spectrum cap was set at three licenses. This allowed bidders to flexibly
compete with each other. To reduce the possibility of collusion the regulator did not disclose
the number of participants during the auction. To improve substitutability and to ensure
that operators could receive contiguous licenses the regulator used an augmented switching
rule which allowed standing high bidders to switch their bids to another license. Bids were
in general binding but when switching their bid bidders weren’t required to compensate the
possible drop in prices.
This prolonged the auction and made price discovery impossible. The auction lasted for
nine months yet the final prices were close to reserve prices. Finnish auction is an example
of how attempting to fix inefficiencies can lead to worse problems when not done with ex-
treme care. While the most obvious fix would have been to pay more attention to bindingness
of bids, it might not have been the best one. Some of the licenses sold in the Finnish auction
were very similar to each other, allowing for at least some to be sold as generic blocks, hence
possibly eliminating the need for the augmented switching rule altogether.
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6.2.4 Polish 2015 auction
Polish 2015 auction, which was supposed to take place a year earlier but was canceled due
to faults in auction rules, probably has the most to teach among latest European spectrum
auctions.
First lesson to learn is the importance of proper laws. Polish legislation is such that bids
made during auction were not binding save for a tiny deposit the bidders had to pay in order
to participate in the auction. At any point during and after the auction a bidder could simply
opt out and decline to pay his bid, losing only said deposit. This lead to abnormally high
prices that prolonged the auction and made others question whether the bidders would even
pay the final prices52. The risk was realized in February 2016 when, already after handing
operators the spectrum, NetNet, which was one of the bidders, relinquished its license.
Second lesson is the importance of appropriate reserve price and bid increments. Polish
reserve price was set extremely low at 250 million zloty (12% of the final prices) which, cou-
pled with minimum bid increment of 1%, resulted in an auction lasting over nine months.
While a minimum bid increment of 1% is not bad per se, the auctioneer should always con-
sider maintaining at least some control over the bid increments during the auction. This
way the auctioneer can control the pace at which the auction evolves. For example, the
auctioneer can announce certain range of bid increments which it will follow. Such solution
has been applied in Germany and Finland among others.
Third lesson we can learn from the Polish auction is the importance of designing a proper
ending rule. The combination of lessons one and two forced the Polish regulator UKE to end
the auction prematurely. The regulator decided that the auction would terminate on the
115th round of bidding which would be followed by a sealed-bid round where bidders were
free to bid any amount. This decision was made rather hastily during the auction and caused
some bidders to threaten to sue the regulator if auction was ended prematurely. Regulators
should include the ending rule in the auction regulation to avoid controversy of changing the
rules during the auction itself.
52A similar issue was seen in Czech 2012 auction, which was canceled and rerun in 2013.
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7 Conclusions
Auctions are currently the best way to allocate scarce spectrum to mobile network operators.
The previous method of awarding spectrum through administrative process was unintelligi-
ble, slow, and costly for the administrator. These so called beauty contests probably also
resulted in inefficient allocations as it was impossible for the government to figure out the
valuations of different MNOs. In addition to addressing these flaws auctions also bring
the benefits of promoting competition and raising revenue for the government. Hence their
popularity has been steadily increasing for the past twenty years with most governments
nowadays awarding spectrum through auctions.
Among economists the most celebrated auction is the second-price sealed bid auction which
is a variation of the VCG mechanism. Given a set of general assumptions, VCG mechanism
has truthful bidding as a dominant strategy and always results in an efficient outcome. How-
ever, a number of issues arise when trying to apply VCG mechanism in spectrum awards.
The two most significant violations of the assumptions result from bidders having almost
common values and constrained budgets. VCG mechanism also has a tendency to result in
zero or low revenues when goods auctioned are not substitutes. Hence other mechanisms
have been created for use in spectrum auctions.
In Europe, three commonly used spectrum auction models are simultaneous multiple round
auction, clock auction and combinatorial clock auction. All three are ascending bid auctions
where bidding on all goods ceases simultaneously. SMRA is the oldest and most versatile of
the three and can be used in almost all situations. Clock auction works well in a single-band
auctions where licenses are homogeneous. CCA is a variant of clock auction created for
multi-band auctions. It enhances an ascending auction with a sealed bid round with pack-
age bids and a variation of a second price payment rule to allow bidders to simultaneously
express their demands for all different combinations of licenses.
A number of issues remain even when using auction models specifically tailored for spec-
trum auctions. One of the most prevalent is strategic demand reduction which can occur
whenever bidders have multi-unit demand. It causes bidders to lack unambiguous dominant
strategy. Another issue is exposure risk and lack of competitive equilibrium caused by li-
censes being complementaries. Both contiguous licenses and licenses on different bands are
complements with each other. Hence package bidding has been favored especially in multi-
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band auction as a way to nullify exposure risk.
Bidders having common values and imperfect information pose problem in spectrum auction
models, although the negative effects are smaller than in a VCG mechanism. Bidders being
budget constrained is an issue in theory, but it is doubtful that these constraints are bind-
ing in European spectrum auctions. Facilitating competition is regarded as an important
objective since it can help fix many of the problems encountered. Furthermore, increased
competition in the consumer market most likely increases social surplus. However, ascending
auctions are particularly punishing for new entrants and hence additional measures such as
setting set-asides and spectrum caps are often required to attract them.
Regulators can address some issues through good auction design. Since every spectrum
auction is different, there does not exist any one-size-fits-all solution. Hence the design pro-
cess plays an important role. It usually consists of three steps. First the auctioneers designs
the product, then chooses the spectrum auction model, and lastly adds rules to improve the
efficiency of the model. Auctioneers have had varying success with their auction design. In
best case good auction design can indeed improve the efficiency of the auction - but too
eager tinkering with the rules can lead to complete failure.
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Appendices
Appendix A
Spectrum auction regulations and results
Australian 700 MHz and 2500 MHz Auction (2013)
Auction regulation:http://www.acma.gov.au/~/media/Spectrum%20Licensing%20Policy/
Information/pdf/Auctionguide%20pdf.pdf
Auction results: http://www.acma.gov.au/Industry/Spectrum/Digital-Dividend-700MHz-and-25Gz-Auction/
Reallocation/digital-dividend-auction-results
Australian 1800 MHz Auction (2016)
Auction regulation: http://www.acma.gov.au/~/media/Spectrum%20Licensing%20Policy/
Information/pdf/Auction%20guide%20_1800%20MHz%20spectrum%20auction%20pdf.pdf
Auction results: http://www.acma.gov.au/sitecore/content/Home/Industry/Spectrum/
Spectrum-projects/1800-MHz-band/1800-mhz-band-auction-strong-result-reveals-high-demand-for-regional-spectrum
Austrian 800 MHz, 900 MHz and 1800 MHz Auction (2013)
Auction regulation:https://www.rtr.at/en/tk/multibandauktion_AU/27890_2013-03-26_
F1_11_Tender_Document_Multiband_Auction_2013.pdf
Auction results: http://cdn1.telekomaustria.com/final/de/media/pdf/TKA_acquires_
austrian_spectrum_Presentation.pdf
Czech 800 MHz, 1800 MHz and 2600 MHz auction (2012)
Auction regulation (in Czech): http://www.ctu.cz/vyhlaseni-vyberoveho-rizeni-na-kmitocty-v-pasmech-800-mhz-1800-mhz-2600-mhz-2012
Auction results: Auction cancelled http://www.ctu.eu/main.php?pageid=342
Czech 800 MHz, 1800 MHz and 2600 MHz auction (2013)
Auction regulation (press release):http://www.ctu.eu/164/download/Press_releases/pr25_
08042013_an.pdf
Auction results: http://www.ctu.eu/164/download/Spectrum%20Auction/2013/invitation_
to_tender_15_08_2013_summary_auction_results_20_11_2013.pdf
Finnish 800 MHz Auction (2013)
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Auction regulation (in Finnish): https://www.viestintavirasto.fi/attachments/maaraykset/
Viestintavirasto642012M.pdf
Auction results: https://www.viestintavirasto.fi/en/ficora/news/2013/endof4gspectrumauction.
html
French 700 MHz Auction (2015)
Auction regulation (in French): http://www.arcep.fr/uploads/tx_gsavis/15-0825.pdf
Auction results: http://www.arcep.fr/index.php?id=8571&tx_gsactualite_pi1[uid]
=1806&tx_gsactualite_pi1[annee]=&tx_gsactualite_pi1[theme]=&tx_gsactualite_pi1[motscle]
=&tx_gsactualite_pi1[backID]=26&cHash=7e1d824a1659bb2e7723a117bffbff80&L=1
German 700 MHz, 900 MHz, 1500 MHz and 1800 MHz Auction (2015)
Auction regulation: http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BNetzA/
Areas/Telecommunications/TelecomRegulation/FrequencyManagement/ElectronicCommunicationsServices/
DecisionP2016_pdf.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3
Auction results: http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/EN/Areas/Telecommunications/Companies/
FrequencyManagement/ElectronicCommunicationsServices/MobileBroadbandProject2016/
project2016_node.html
Polish 800 MHz and 2600 MHz Auction (2015)
Auction regulation (in Polish): http://uke.gov.pl/files/?id_plik=17709
Auction results: https://en.uke.gov.pl/files/?id_plik=20951
Swiss 800 MHz, 900 MHz, 1800 MHz, 2100 MHz and 2600 MHz Auction (2012)
Auction regulation and results: http://www.news.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/attachments/
26004.pdf
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Appendix B
Data on European spectrum auctions
Figure 5: Information on recent European spectrum auctions
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